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Executive Summary 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present a general framework for electricity market design in Latin 
American Countries (LACs) that addresses the current problems facing electricity supply 
industries (ESIs) in this region.  The major issue addressed is what market rules, market 
structures, and legal and regulatory institutions are necessary to establish a competitive 
wholesale market that provides the maximum possible benefits to consumers consistent with the 
long-term financial viability of the ESI.   
 
The paper first presents a theoretical foundation for analyzing the electricity market 
design problem.  A generic principal-agent model is presented and its applicability to the 
electricity market design problem explained.  It is then applied to illustrate the incentives for firm 
behavior under regulation versus market environments.  The impact of government versus 
private ownership on firm behavior in both market and regulated environments is also addressed 
using this model.  This discussion is used to guide our choices for the important lessons for 
electricity market design in developed countries and LACs. 
 
Using the experiences from ESI reform in developed countries, the paper presents five 
essential features of a successful wholesale electricity market. The first is the need for a 
sufficient number of independent suppliers for a competitive market to be possible.  Merely 
declaring the market open to competition will not result in new entry unless no single supplier is 
able to dominate the market.  Second is a forward market for electricity where privately-owned 
firms are able to sell long-term commitments to supply electricity.  This report argues that the 
conventional wisdom of establishing a competitive spot market first leading to a competitive 
forward market is an extremely expensive process in developed countries and is prohibitively 
expensive in developing countries.  Third is the need for the active involvement of as many 
consumers of electricity as is economically feasible in the operation of the wholesale market.  
This involvement should occur both in the long-term and short-term market.  In the short-term 
market, there must be a number of buyers willing to alter their consumption of electricity in 
response to short-term price signals.  Fourth is the importance of a transmission network to 
facilitate commerce, meaning that the transmission network must have sufficient capacity so that 
all suppliers face significant competition.  This implies a dramatically different approach to 
determining the quantity and magnitude of transmission network expansions in a market regime.  
The final lesson is the need to establish a credible regulatory mechanism as early as possible in 
the restructuring process.   An important lesson from developed countries around the world is 
that the initial market design will have flaws.  This implies the need for ongoing market 
monitoring to correct these flaws before they develop into disasters.   
 
  The paper then takes on the issue of the specific challenges to LAC restructuring.  Rather 
than focus on the details of specific markets, the paper instead identifies a number of problems 
common to LACs and provides recommended solutions to each of these problems.  A major 
theme of this section is a warning that short-term solutions to market design flaws can have long-
term market efficiency costs.  The paper identifies seven major challenges to Latin American 
ESI restructuring.  The first is related to the problem of introducing wholesale markets in 
systems dominated by hydroelectric capacity.  This section also deals with the related issue of 
how using cheap hydroelectric power keeps electricity prices low but the risk of electricity 
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shortages high. The second issue is concerned with the difficulties of establishing an active 
forward market for electricity in LACs.  The third relates to the LAC-specific challenges 
associated with establishing an independent and regulatory body.  The fourth addresses the 
advisability of cost-based versus bid-based dispatch of generation units in LAC wholesale 
markets.  The fifth is how to regulate the default provider retail electricity price in LACs.  The 
sixth concerns the advisability of capacity payments mechanism for ensuring energy adequacy in 
markets where demand is expected to grow rapidly.  The final issue is the role of government 
versus private ownership in LACs. 
 
  The report then discusses specific market design challenges in five LACs. These 
countries are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, and Mexico.  A number of these challenges are 
specific examples of the general challenges discussed earlier in the paper, whereas others are 
unique to the geography, natural resource base or legal environment in the country. 
 
  The report closes with a proposed market design that should serve as a baseline market 
design for all LACs.  Deviations from this basic design could be substantial depending on initial 
conditions in the industry and the country, but the ideal behind proposing this design is to have a 
useful starting point for all LAC restructuring processes. 
  iv 
Contents 
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1 
2.  The Market Design Problem................................................................................................... 4 
2.1.  The Principal-Agent Problem............................................................................................. 6 
2.2.  Applying the Principal-Agent Model to the Market Design Process ................................. 7 
2.3.  Individual Rationality Under a Market Mechanism versus a Regulatory Process........... 10 
2.4.  Individual Rationality Constraint Under Government versus Private Ownership............ 17 
3.  Lessons for Designing a Competitive Wholesale Market from Developed Countries............ 20 
3.1.  Essential Features of a Competitive Wholesale Market................................................... 20 
3.1.1.  Divestiture of Suppliers............................................................................................. 22 
3.1.2.  Forward Contracts and Vesting Contracts................................................................. 23 
3.1.3.  Involving Final Demand............................................................................................ 28 
3.1.4.  Economic Reliability versus Engineering Reliability of a Transmission Network... 34 
3.1.5.  Specific Market Design Lessons from Developed Countries.................................... 37 
3.1.6.  Credible and Effective Regulatory Process ............................................................... 39 
3.2.1.  The Role of Government-Owned Market Participants.............................................. 43 
3.2.2.  Cost-Based Dispatch and Local Market Power Mitigation....................................... 45 
4.  Challenges to Implementing a Competitive Wholesale Market Unique to LACs............... 49 
4.1.   The Gambling with the Weather Problem and the Cost-of-Deficit Parameter................ 50 
4.2.  Fostering a Forward Market for Electricity...................................................................... 54 
4.3.  Establishing an Independent Regulator ............................................................................ 56 
4.4. Bid-Based versus Cost-Based Dispatch and Pricing ......................................................... 61 
4.5.  Regulating Default Retail Rates........................................................................................ 66 
4.6.   Capacity Adequacy in Rapidly Growing ESIs................................................................. 69 
4.7.   Government versus Private Participation in the ESI........................................................ 72 
5.  Lessons for Market Design from Specific LACs..................................................................... 75 
5.1.   Brazil................................................................................................................................ 75 
5.2.   Chile................................................................................................................................. 77 
5.3.   Colombia.......................................................................................................................... 81 
5.4.   Honduras.......................................................................................................................... 82 
5.5.   Mexico............................................................................................................................. 83 
6.  Suggested Standard Market Design For LACs........................................................................ 84 
7.  Concluding Comments on Designing a Competitive Wholesale Market................................ 87 
 
  v 
 
  vi 
1 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
One lesson from the past decade of electricity supply industry (ESI) reforms in developed 
countries is that it is easy to make extremely costly mistakes and very difficult to avoid making 
any mistakes.   Wholesale market meltdowns have occurred in California and in New Zealand.  
All other countries with wholesale electricity markets have experienced sustained periods of very 
high prices that cannot be explained by fuel or other input cost increases;  many of these 
episodes have overwhelmed the regulatory institution that oversees the wholesale market.  These 
experiences suggest that the only thing a government considering ESI reform can be sure of is 
that mistakes will be made in the initial market design and that the regulatory institution will face 
a number of difficult challenges that it is not prepared to deal with. 
  Because the legal and regulatory institutions necessary for a competitive wholesale 
electricity market are less mature in Latin American Countries (LACs) than in developed 
countries, successful power sector reform should be even more difficult in these countries.   
Further complicating this task is the fact that the pre-reform financial condition of the ESIs in 
most LACs is much worse than the pre-reform financial health of the ESIs in all of the developed 
countries that have restructured.  The primary motivation for restructuring in LACs is to attract 
private investment capital to all aspects of the industry in a fast-growing market with a limited 
transmission and distribution network infrastructure. In contrast, the primary motivation for 
restructuring in developed countries is to improve the operating efficiency of existing capacity 
and impose greater economic discipline on new capacity investment decisions in slower-growing 
markets with more than adequate generation capacity and extensive transmission and distribution 
networks.  These divergent motivations make restructuring a higher-risk activity in LACs.   
However, if done correctly, restructuring is also a higher expected return activity because of its 
more ambitious goals in LACs.  The paper proposes a generic restructuring process for LACs 
that limits these risks so that significant potential net benefits of ESI restructuring can be realized 
both in the short run and long run. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a framework for analyzing the electricity market 
design process in LACs that addresses the problems facing all ESIs, as well as those that are 
unique to countries in this region.  The major issue addressed is:  What market rules, market 
structures, and legal and regulatory institutions are necessary to establish competitive wholesale  
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markets that provide the maximum possible benefits to consumers consistent with the long-term 
financial viability of ESIs in LACs? 
  This paper will first use outcomes from the past decade of ESI restructuring in the United 
States, Europe and Australia and New Zealand to identify the major challenges facing all 
electricity market design processes.  These challenges will then be placed in the LAC context.  
For example, the extreme dependence of many LACs on hydroelectric power makes the 
experience of hydro-dependent countries such as Norway and New Zealand particularly 
instructive.  The paper will then identify the wholesale electricity market design problems unique 
to LACs.  These problems and their importance to ESI reform in LACs will be identified with 
respect to the market structure and performance of the ESIs in five LACs that I visited as 
background for preparing this report: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras and Mexico.  The 
countries further along in this process—Brazil, Chile and Colombia—are used to identify 
problems that arise in the operation of a wholesale market and its regulatory oversight in LACs.  
The experiences of all five countries provide useful background for my discussion of the 
impediments to the reform process in LACs. 
My analysis is organized around five major themes.  First is the necessity of a forward 
market for electricity where privately owned firms are able to sell long-term commitments to 
supply electricity.  I will argue that the conventional wisdom of first establishing a competitive 
spot market in order to foster an active forward market has proven to be an extremely expensive 
undertaking in developed countries.  I believe it is prohibitively expensive in most developing 
countries.  Experience from developed country ESI restructuring around the world has shown 
that the major source of supply-side benefits from industry restructuring is the competitive 
procurement of long-term energy commitments of sufficient magnitude and duration to allow 
suppliers to fund the construction of new generation facilities.  The spread of wholesale forward 
markets throughout the US during the early 1980s led to new generation capacity investment 
decisions driven by purely economic factors.  As a result, the vast majority of new generation 
facilities have significantly lower operating costs than existing generation capacity.  This paper 
suggests a market design process for LACs that maximizes the likelihood that a transparent and 
active forward market for electricity will form.  
3 
 
                                                
  A second theme deals with the difficulties created by restructuring an ESI with 
significant dependence on hydroelectric capacity.  All LACs with significant hydroelectric 
capacity have experienced energy shortages relative to demand at the prevailing retail price 
before, during, or after the transition to a wholesale market regime.
1  Different from fossil fuel-
based electricity systems, higher electricity prices do not increase the supply of the input energy 
source.  Specifically, rainfall does not increase in response to higher electricity prices.  This 
implies that the greater the share of electricity produced using hydroelectric capacity the larger is 
the potential risk of these events.  Because most existing hydroelectric capacity in LACs was 
constructed during the former state-owned monopoly regime, governments find it difficult to 
resist increasing this risk of shortages by overusing water during low rainfall years.  This leads to 
artificially low wholesale electricity prices that discourage investment in fossil-fuel sources that 
would provide much-needed insurance against water shortages.  This paper suggests a number of 
market rule, market structure and regulatory oversight changes to limit the incentives for 
inefficient use of water and increase the incentives for new investment in more reliable 
electricity sources. 
  The third theme emphasizes and elaborates on the need for the active involvement of as 
many electricity customers as is economically feasible in the operation of the wholesale market.  
Final customers must be actively involved in both the long-term and short-term market.  In the 
long-term market, wholesale electricity purchasers, typically retailers and large industrial and 
commercial consumers, must be permitted to make the long-term purchasing commitments with 
electricity suppliers that allow these firms to finance generation capacity expansion.  In the short-
term market, there should be as many final electricity consumers as possible able to benefit from 
altering their hourly electricity consumption in response to short-term price signals.  Flexibility 
in consumption is crucial to increasing the competitiveness of the short-term energy and 
ancillary services market.  The ability to shift significant amounts of electricity demand across 
hours of the day or days of the week in response to price changes is far more important to 
limiting the market power of firms than is the ability to reduce consumption during all hours of 
the day in response to price changes. 
 
1See Fischer and Galetovic (2001) for the case of Chile, Ayala and Millan (2002) for the case of Colombia, and Parente 
(2002) for the case of Brazil.  
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  The fourth theme is the importance of adequate transmission capacity to support a 
competitive wholesale market.  Here I will make the distinction between a reliable transmission 
network to support a competitive wholesale market and a reliable transmission network to 
support a vertically integrated monopoly ESI.  Because of the initial condition of the 
transmission network in most LACs, I will argue that this distinction has important implications 
for the design of the wholesale market and the role of the independent system operator.  
  The final theme is often overlooked and its importance the most underappreciated in the 
market design process.  This is the need for a credible regulatory mechanism as early as possible 
in the restructuring process.  Spiller and Martorell (1996) argue that this is a key factor in the 
success of ESI reform in Chile.  As discussed above, all governments and regulators can be 
virtually certain that the initial wholesale market design will have flaws.  This implies the need 
for ongoing market monitoring to correct these flaws before they develop into disasters.  As the 
California electricity crisis demonstrates, even the most experienced regulator can make 
enormous mistakes.  Even though regulation is an imperfect process, it is most effective when 
the regulator has a reputation for technical and economic expertise and independence from the 
government in power.   Consequently, perhaps the most important challenge facing regulators in 
LACs is how to establish a reputation for technical and economic expertise so that as few 
decisions as possible are overturned on judicial review or even taken to judicial review.   I will 
provide recommendations for solving this initial conditions problem in establishing a credible 
regulatory process that protects consumers from the exercise of market power and suppliers from 
the attempts of politicians to expropriate the value of their investments. 
 
2.   The Market Design Problem 
There are two primary dimensions of the market design problem.  The first is the extent to which 
market mechanisms versus regulatory processes are used to set the prices consumers pay.  The 
second is the extent to which market participants are government versus privately owned.  Given 
the technologies for producing and delivering electricity to final consumers in a country, the 
market designer faces two basic challenges.  The first is how to cause producers to supply 
electricity in both a technically and allocatively efficient manner.  Technically efficient  
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production obtains the maximum amount of electricity for a given quantity of inputs, such as 
capital, labor, materials and input energy. Allocatively efficient production uses the minimum 
cost mix of inputs to produce a given level of output. 
  The second challenge is how to cause the simultaneous actions of all suppliers and 
retailers to set the lowest possible retail price consistent with the long-term financial viability of 
the industry.  Consequently, the goal of the market design process is to devise mechanisms for 
compensating market participants for their actions, so that final consumers pay the lowest 
possible retail prices needed for the industry to sustain itself over the long-term.  This involves 
choosing a point in the market versus regulation dimension and government versus private 
ownership dimension for each segment of the electricity supply industry. 
  Conceptually, the market designer chooses the number and sizes of each market 
participant and the rules for determining the revenues received by each market participant to 
maximize its objective function.  There are two key constraints on the market designer’s 
optimization problem.  The first is that once the market designer selects the rules for determining 
the revenues each market participant receives, the market participant will choose a strategy that 
maximizes his payoff given the rules set by the market designer.  This constraint implies that the 
market designer must recognize that all market participants will maximize expected profits given 
the rules the market designer selects.  The second constraint is that each market participant must 
expect to receive from the compensation scheme chosen by the market designer more than their 
opportunity cost of participating in the ESI.  The first constraint is called the individual 
rationality constraint because it assumes each market participant will behave in a rational 
(expected payoff-maximizing) manner.  The second constraint is called the participation 
constraint, because it implies that firms must expect that participation in the ESI is more 
attractive than their next best alternative.  
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2.1.  The Principal-Agent Problem 
To make these features of the market design problem more concrete, it is useful to consider a 
very special case of this process—the generic principal-agent model.  Here a single principal 
designs a compensation scheme for a single agent that maximizes the principal’s expected 
payoff, subject to the agent’s individual rationality constraint and a participation constraint.  Let 
W(x,s) denote the payoff of the principal given the observable outcome of the interaction, x, and 
state of the world, s.  The observable outcome, x, depends on the agent’s action, a, and the true 
state of the world.  In general, x is written as x(a,s) to denote the fact that it depends on both of 
these variables.   
 Let  V(a,y,s) equal the payoff of the agent when it takes the action, a, faces the 
compensation scheme set by the principal, y(x), and true the state of the world is s.  The 
principal’s action is to design the compensation scheme, y(x), a function that relates the outcome 
observed by the principal, x, to the payment made to the agent. 
  With this notation, it is possible to define the two constraints facing the principal in 
designing y(x).  The individual rationality constraint on the agent’s behavior is that it will choose 
its action, a, to maximize its payoff V(a,y,s) (or the expected value of this payoff) given y(x) and 
s (or the distribution of s).  The participation constraint implies that the compensation scheme 
y(x) set by the principal must allow the agent to achieve at least its reservation level of utility or 
expected utility V
*.  There are two basic versions of this model.  The first assumes that the agent 
does not observe the true state of the world when it takes its action, and the other assumes the 
agent observes s before taking its action.  In the first case, the agent’s choice is:   
s)) y(x), (V(a, E argmax a s
a
* = , 






*,s).  In the second case, the agent’s problem 
is:    
s) y(x), V(a, argmax (s) a
a
* = , 
and the participation constraint is V(a
*(s) ,y(x
* ),s) > V
* for all s, where x
* = x(a




  An enormous number of bilateral economic interactions fit this generic principal-agent 
framework. Examples include the client-lawyer, patient-doctor, lender-borrower, employer-
worker, and firm owner-manager interactions.  A client seeking legal services designs a 
compensation scheme for her lawyer that depends on the observable outcomes (such as the 
verdict in the case) that causes the lawyer to maximize the client’s payoff function subject to the 
constraint that the lawyer will take actions to maximize his payoff given this compensation 
scheme and the fact that the lawyer must find the compensation scheme sufficiently attractive to 
take on the case.   Another example is the firm owner designing a compensation scheme that 
causes the manager to maximize the value of the owner’s assets subject to the constraint that the 
firm manager will take actions to maximize her payoff given the scheme is in place and the fact 
that it must provide a higher payoff to the manager than she could receive elsewhere.   
 
2.2.  Applying the Principal-Agent Model to the Market Design Process 
 
An example of this principal-agent model relevant to ESI restructuring is the regulator-utility 
interaction.  In this case, the regulator designs a scheme for compensating the vertically 
integrated monopoly for the actions that it takes, recognizing the fact the once this regulatory 
mechanism is put in place the utility will attempt to maximize its payoff function given this 
regulatory mechanism.  In this case, y(x) would be the mechanism used by the regulator to 
compensate the firm for its actions.  For example, under a simple ex post cost-of-service 
regulatory mechanism, x would be the output produced by the firm, and y(x) would be the firm’s 
total cost of providing this output.  Under a price cap regulatory mechanism, x would be the 
change in the consumer price index for the United States (US) economy and y(x) would be the 
total revenues the firm receives, assuming it serves all demand at the price set by this regulatory 
mechanism.  The incentives for firm behavior created by any potential regulatory mechanism can 
be studied within the context of this principal-agent model. 
  This modeling framework is also useful for understanding the incentives for firm 
behavior in a market environment.  A competitive market is another possible way to compensate 
a firm for the actions that it takes.  For example, the regulator could require this firm and other 
firms to bid their willingness to supply as a function of price and only chose the firms with bids 
below the lowest price necessary to meet the aggregate demand for the product.  In this case x  
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can be thought of as the firm’s output and y(x) the firm’s total revenues from producing x and 
being paid this market-clearing price per unit sold.  Viewed from this perspective, markets are 
simply another regulatory mechanism for compensating a firm for the actions it takes.   
  It is well known that profit-maximizing firms participating in a competitive market have 
a strong incentive to produce their output in a technically and allocatively efficient manner.  
However, it is also well known that profit-maximizing firms have no unilateral incentive to pass 
on these minimum production costs in the price they charge to consumers.  It is only when 
competition among firms is sufficiently fierce that this will occur. 
  Economic theory provides conditions under which a market will yield an optimal solution 
to the problem of causing the suppliers to provide their output to consumers at the lowest 
possible price.   One of these conditions is the requirement that suppliers are atomistic, meaning 
that all producers believe they are so small relative to the market that they have no ability to 
influence the market price through their actions.  Unfortunately, this condition is unlikely to hold 
for the case of electricity given the size of most market participants before the reform process 
starts.  These firms recognize that if they remain large, they will have the ability to influence 
both market and political outcomes through their unilateral actions.   Moreover, the minimum 
efficient scale of electricity generation, transmission and distribution is such that it is unlikely to 
be least costly for the industry as a whole to separate electricity production into a large number 
of extremely small firms.  So there is an underlying economic justification for allowing these 
firms to remain large, although certainly not as large as they would like to be.  This is one reason 
why the electricity market design process is so difficult.  This problem is particularly acute for 
small Latin American countries such as Honduras and other small Central American countries 
without substantial transmission interconnections with neighboring countries.  The minimum 
efficient scale for a new combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) facility may be a substantial 
fraction of the peak demand in these countries. 
  This principal-agent model is also useful for understanding why industry outcomes can 
differ so dramatically depending on whether the industry is government or privately-owned.   
First, the objective function of the firm’s owner differs across the two regimes.  Under 
government ownership all of the citizens of the country are shareholders.  These owners are also 
severely limited in the sorts of mechanisms they can design to compensate the management of  
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the firm.  For example, there is no liquid market for selling their ownership stake in this firm.  It 
is virtually impossible for them to remove the management of this firm.  They don’t even have a 
legal right to their ownership stake in the firm.  In contrast, a shareholder in a privately owned 
firm has a clearly defined and legally enforceable property right that can be sold in a relatively 
liquid market.  If they own enough shares in the firm or can get together with other large 
shareholders, they can remove the management of the company.  Finally, by selling their shares, 
they can severely limit the ability of the company to raise capital for new investment, because a 
lower stock price means that the management must now issue more shares to raise the same 
amount of money.  In contrast, the government-owned firm obtains the funds necessary for new 
investment primarily through the political process, so there is very little a private citizen can do 
to prevent a politically savvy government-owned firm from undertaking new investment. 
  This discussion illustrates the point that despite the fact that both the government-owned 
and privately-owned firm have access to exactly the same technologies to generate, transmit and 
distribute electricity, dramatically different industry outcomes in terms of the mix of generation 
capacity installed, the price consumers pay and the amount they consume can occur because the 
schemes for compensating each firm’s management, y(x), differ.  Because the owners of the two 
firms have different objective functions and face different sets of feasible mechanisms for 
compensating their management, they find it optimal to select different mechanisms for 
compensating the management for the actions it takes.   
Applying the generic principal-agent model to the issue of government versus private 
ownership implies that different industry outcomes should occur if a government-owned, 
vertically integrated geographic monopolist is asked to provide electricity to the same geographic 
area that a privately owned geographic monopolist previously served, even if both monopolists 
face the same regulatory mechanism for setting the prices they charge to retail consumers. 
  Applying the logic of the principal-agent model at the level of the regulator-firm 
interaction, as opposed to the firm owner-management interaction, implies an additional source 
of differences in market outcomes if, as is often the case, the government-owned monopoly faces 
a different regulatory process than the privately owned monopoly. 
  In the competitive market context, the extent of government participation in the industry 
creates an additional source of differences in industry outcomes.  Because the nature of the  
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principal-agent relationship between the firm’s owner and its management is different under 
private ownership versus government ownership, an otherwise identical government-owned firm 
can be expected to behave differently in a market environment from how this firm would behave 
if it were privately owned.  Therefore, even for two markets with the same number and sizes of 
firms, market outcomes will differ depending on the ownership status (government owned versus 
privately owned) of all of firms in the market.  These differences in market outcomes can be 
particularly significant if the largest firms in the industry are government owned instead of 
privately owned. 
Consequently, in its most general form, the market design problem is composed of 
multiple layers of principal-agent interactions where the same principal can often interact with a 
number of agents.  For example, in the case of a competitive wholesale electricity market, the 
same regulator interacts with all the firms in the ESI.  The market designer must recognize the 
impact of all of these principal-agent relationships in designing an electricity supply industry to 
achieve her market design goals.  The vast majority of electricity market design failures result 
from ignoring the individual rationality constraints implied by both the regulator-firm and firm 
owner-management principal-agent relations. The individual rationality constraint most often 
ignored is that privately-owned firms will maximize their profits from participating in a 
wholesale electricity market given the market rules set by the market designers.  In addition, if 
offered the opportunity to provide input to the market design process, individual rationality 
would also imply that market participants would argue for market rules that enhance their ability 
to maximize expected profits.   
It is important to emphasize that this individual rationality constraint holds whether or not 
the privately owned profit-maximizing firm is one of a number of firms in a market environment 
or a single vertically integrated monopolist.  The only difference between these two 
environments is the set of actions that the firm is legally able to take to maximize its profits. 
 
2.3.  Individual Rationality Under a Market Mechanism versus a Regulatory Process 
 
The set of actions available to firms in a market environment generally differ from those 
available to it in a regulated-monopoly environment.  For example, under a market mechanism 
firms can increase their profits by both reducing the costs of producing a given level of output or  
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by increasing the price they charge for this output.  In contrast, in a regulated monopoly 
environment, the firm does not set the price it receives for its output.  Instead, the legal contract 
between the firm and regulator usually requires the firm to supply all that is demanded at a price 
set by the regulator in exchange for the firm being given a legal monopoly to supply all 
customers in a given geographic area at the price set by the regulator, as well as the opportunity 
to earn a reasonable rate of return on their investment from the prudent operation of their 
facilities. 
  Defining the incentive constraint for a privately owned firm operating in a competitive 
electricity market is relatively straightforward.  Because the firm would like to maximize profits, 
it has a strong incentive to produce any amount of output at minimum cost.  In other words, the 
firm will find it individually rational to produce in a technically and allocatively efficient 
manner.  However, as discussed above, the firm has little incentive to set a price that only 
recovers these production costs.  In fact, the firm would like to take actions to raise the price it 
receives above both the average and marginal cost of producing its output.  Profit-maximizing 
behavior implies that the firm will choose a price or level of output such that the increase in 
revenue it earns from supplying one more unit equals the additional cost that it incurs from 
producing one more unit of output.  This is the same thing as saying that the firm will withhold 
output from the market until the cost savings from withholding one more unit of output is less 
than or equal to the total revenue loss from withholding that unit of output from the market.  This 
is a more general restatement of a standard result from profit-maximizing behavior when the firm 
has the ability to influence the market price: The firm will produce at the point that the marginal 
revenue from selling an additional unit of output equals the marginal cost of producing that unit 
of output.    
  Figure 1 provides a simple model of the unilateral profit-maximizing behavior of a 
supplier in a bid-based electricity market.  Let Qd equal the level of market demand for a given 
hour and SO(p) the aggregate willingness to supply as a function of the price for all other market 
participants besides the firm under consideration.  Figure 1(a) plots the inelastic aggregate 
demand curve and the upward sloping supply curve for all other firms besides the one under 
consideration.  Figure 1(b) subtracts this aggregate supply curve for all other market participants 
from the market demand to produce the residual demand curve faced by this supplier, DR(p) =  
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Qd - SO(p).  This panel also plots the marginal cost curve for this supplier, as well as the 
marginal revenue curve associated with DR(p).   The intersection of this marginal revenue curve 
with the supplier’s marginal cost curve yields the profit-maximizing level of output and market 
price for this supplier given the bids submitted by all other market participants.  This price-
quantity pair is denoted by (P
*,Q
*) in Figure 1(b).  Profit-maximizing behavior by the firm 
implies the following relationship between the marginal cost at Q
*, which I denote by MC(Q
*), 
and P





* = - 1/,, (1) 
where , = DRΝ(P
*)*(P
*/DR(P
*)).   Because the slope of the firm’s residual demand at this level 
of output is finite, the market price is larger than the supplier’s marginal cost.  The price-quantity 
pair associated with the intersection of DR(p) with the supplier’s marginal cost curve is denoted 
(P
c,Q
c).  It is important to emphasize that even though the price-quantity pair (P
c,Q
c) is often 
called the competitive output level, producing at this level is not unilateral profit-maximizing for 
the firm if it faces a downward-sloping residual demand curve.  This is another way of saying 
that price-taking behavior—the firm acting as if it had no ability to impact the market price—is 
never individually rational.  It will only occur as an equilibrium outcome if competitive 
conditions in the market are particularly fierce. 
  Figure 1(a)-(b) illustrates the essential difference between the firm’s unilateral profit-
maximizing level of output when it has the ability to influence the market price through its own 
actions and its profit-maximizing level output when the supplier believes it has no ability to 
influence the market price because of competitive conditions in the market.  The supplier 
withholds output from the market relative to the price-taking outcome, (P
c,Q
c), because it knows 
that by doing so, it raises the price that it receives for all the units it sells.  The firm continues to 
withhold output from the market until the cost reduction from withholding an additional unit of 
output from the market is exactly balanced by the revenue reduction the supplier experiences 
from withdrawing that unit of output from the market.  In contrast, a price-taking firm produces 
at the point that marginal cost associated with an additional unit of output is equal to consumers’ 
willingness to pay for that additional unit of output. 
  A firm that influences market prices as shown in Figure 1(a)-(b) is said to be exercising 
its unilateral market power.  A firm possesses unilateral market power if it has the ability to raise  
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the market price through its unilateral actions and profit from this price increase.  We would 
expect all privately owned profit-maximizing firms to behave in this manner.  This is equivalent 
to saying that the firm satisfies its individual rationality constraint.  I would like to emphasize 
that as long as a supplier faces a residual demand curve with any upward slope, it has the ability 
to exercise unilateral market power. 
  Figure 1(c)-(d) illustrates the extremely unlikely case that the supplier faces an infinitely 
elastic residual demand curve and therefore finds it in its unilateral profit-maximizing to produce 
at the point that the market price is equal to its marginal cost.  This point is denoted (P
**,Q
**). 
The supplier faces an infinitely elastic residual demand curve because the SO(p) curve is infinity 
elastic at P
**, meaning that all other firms besides this supplier are able to produce all that is 
demanded if the price is above P
**.   Note that even in this extreme case the supplier is still 
producing at the point where the marginal revenue curve associated with DR(p) crosses its 
marginal cost curve.  The only difference is that this marginal revenue curve is also equal to its 
average revenue curve, because DR(p) is infinitely price elastic, meaning that it is a horizontal 
line.  Even in this extreme case, the firm continues to set prices that satisfy equation (1).   
However, because the slope of the firm’s residual demand curve is infinite, 1/,, and is equal to 
zero so that equation (1) implies producing at the point where price equals marginal cost. 
  Figure 1 demonstrates that the individual rationality constraint in the context of a market 
mechanism is equivalent to the supplier exercising all available unilateral market power.  Even in 
the extreme case of an infinitely elastic residual demand curve given Figures 1(c) and 1(d), the 
supplier still exercises all available unilateral market power.  However, in this case the supplier 
cannot increase its profits by withholding output that can be produced at a marginal cost less than 
market price, because the firm possesses no unilateral market power, which means that it is 
unable to raise market price by its own actions. 
   Individual rationality in the context of a regulatory process still implies that the firm will 
maximize profits given the mechanism for compensating it set by the regulator.   However, in 
this case the firm is usually unable to set the price it charges consumers or the level of output it 
supplies because of the explicit or implicit regulatory contract described above.  Consequently, 
the firm must take more subtle approaches to maximizing its profits because the regulator 
typically sets the output price and requires the firm to supply all that is demanded at this  
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regulated price.  In this case the individual rationality constraint can imply that the firm will 
produce its output in a technically or allocatively inefficient manner because of how the 
regulatory process sets the price that the firm is able to charge.  For example, the well-known 
Averch and Johnson (1962) model of cost-of-service regulation assumes that the regulated firm 
produces its output using capital, K, and labor, L, yet the price the regulator allows the firm to 
charge for capital services in setting its output price is greater than the actual price the regulated 
firm pays for capital services.  This implies that a profit-maximizing firm facing the pricing-
setting constraint implied by this regulatory process will produce its output using capital more 
intensively relative to labor than would be the case if the regulatory process did not allow a 
different price for capital services from the one the firm actually pays.  The Averch and Johnson 
model illustrates a very general point associated with the individual rationality constraint in 
regulated settings: It is virtually impossible to design a regulatory mechanism that causes a 
privately owned profit-maximizing firm to produce in a least-cost manner. 
  The major reason why the regulator is unable to set prices that achieve the market 
designer’s goal of least-cost production is that the regulated firm usually knows more about its 
production process or demand than the regulator.  Although both the firm and regulator have 
substantial expertise in the technology of generating, transmitting and distributing electricity to 
final consumers, the firm has a much better idea of precisely how these technologies are 
implemented to serve its customers.  This informational asymmetry leads to disputes between the 
firm and the regulator over the minimum cost mode of production to serve the firm’s demand.  
Consequently, the regulator can never know the minimum cost mode production to serve final 
demand.    
  Moreover, there are laws against the regulator confiscating the firm’s assets through the 
prices it sets, and the firm is aware of this fact.  This creates the potential for disputes between 
the firm and the regulator over the price level that provides strong incentives for least-cost 
production but does not confiscate the firm’s assets.   All governments recognize this fact and 
allow the firm the opportunity to subject the regulator to judicial review of any regulatory 
decision about the level of the firm’s price.  To avoid the expense and potential loss of credibility 
of a judicial review, the regulator may instead prefer to set a slightly higher regulated price to 
guarantee that the firm will not submit this decision for judicial review.  This informational  
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asymmetry in the regulatory process reduces the firm’s incentive to produce its output in a least-
cost manner. 
  Wolak (1994) studies the regulator-utility interaction between California water utilities 
and the California Public Utilities Commission.  He specifies and estimates an econometric 
model of this principal-agent interaction and quantifies the magnitude of the distortions from 
minimum cost production induced by the informational asymmetry between firm and the 
regulator about one aspect of the firm’s production process.  Even for the very straightforward 
technology of providing local water delivery services, where the extent of informational 
asymmetries between the firm and the regulator is likely to be small, Wolak (1994) finds that 
actual production costs are between 5 percent and 10 percent higher than they would be under 
least-cost production.  This result suggests that the deviations from least-cost production in the 
electricity supply industry are likely to be much greater because the extent of the informational 
asymmetries between the firm and regulator about the firm’s production process are much 
greater. 
  The market designer need not worry about the impact of informational asymmetries on a 
firm’s mode of production in a competitive market.  There is no legal requirement that a market 
mechanism set the price a firm receives above some minimum level.  Different from price-
regulated environments, there are no laws against a competitive market setting prices that 
confiscate a firm’s assets.  Any firm that is unable to cover its costs of production at the market 
price must eventually exit the industry.  Firms cannot file for judicial review of the prices set by 
a competitive market, unless they believe some antitrust law has been violated.  Competition 
among firms leads high-cost firms to exit the industry and be replaced by lower-cost firms.  
Contrary to the regulated regime, there is no need to determine if a firm’s incurred production 
costs are the result of a least-cost mode of production.  If the market is sufficiently competitive 
and has low barriers to entry, then any firm that is able to remain in business must be producing 
its output at or close to minimum cost.  Otherwise, a more efficient firm could enter and 
profitably undercut the price of this firm.  The risk that firms not producing in a least-cost 
manner will be forced to exit creates much stronger incentives for least-cost production than 
would be the case under regulation, where the firm recognizes that the regulator does not know  
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the least-cost mode of production and that it can exploit this fact through technically and 
allocatively inefficient production that may ultimately yield the firm higher profits. 
  This difference in the incentives for least-cost production under regulation versus a 
market mechanism reinforces the impact of individual rationality constraints on firm behavior 
under a competitive market regime versus a regulated monopoly regime.  In the case of a market 
mechanism the individual rationality constraint (to maximize expected profits) provides strong 
incentives for each firm to produce its output at least cost, but little, if any, incentive to price this 
output to only recover production costs.  In fact, depending on the extent of competition the firm 
faces, it may have an extremely strong incentive to price its output vastly in excess of the 
marginal cost of producing the most expensive unit sold. 
  For the case of the regulated monopoly regime, the individual rationality constraint 
implies that the firm does not produce its output in a least-cost manner.  However, because the 
regulator sets the price the firm is able to charge, this price only recovers the firm’s incurred 
costs.   Consequently, the advantage of regulation is that the market price should not deviate 
significantly from the average cost of producing the firm’s output.  However, the firm has very 
little incentive to make its actual mode of production equal to the least-cost mode of production.  
In contrast, the market regime provides very strong incentives for firms to produce in a least-cost 
manner but—unless the market is competitive—little incentive to pass on these low production 
costs in the prices charged to consumers.   
This discussion shows that the potential exists for consumers to pay lower prices under 
either regime.  Regulation may be favored if the market designer is able to implement a 
regulatory process that is particularly effective at causing the firm to produce in a least-cost 
manner, or if the market designer is unable to establish a sufficiently competitive market so that 
prices are vastly in excess of the marginal cost of producing the last unit sold.  Competition is 
favored if regulation is particularly ineffective at providing incentives for least-cost production 
or if competition is particularly fierce.  Nevertheless, in making the choice between market 
mechanisms and regulatory mechanisms the market designer must make a choice between two 
imperfect worlds.  Which mechanism should be selected depends on which one maximizes the 
market designer’s objective function.  
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2.4.  Individual Rationality Constraint Under Government versus Private Ownership 
 
The individual rationality constraint for a government-owned firm is difficult to characterize for 
two reasons.  First, it is unclear what control the firm’s owners are able to exercise over the 
firm’s management and employees.  Second, it is also unclear what the objective function of the 
firm’s owners is.  For the case of privately owned firms, there are well-defined answers to both 
of these questions.  The firm’s owners have clearly specified legal rights, and their ownership 
shares can be bought and sold by incurring modest transaction costs.  Because, keeping all other 
things equal, investors would like to earn the highest possible return on their investments, and 
shareholders would like the firm’s management to maximize the risk-adjusted rate of return on 
equity.  This implies that the firm’s owners will attempt to devise a compensation scheme for the 
firm’s management that causes them to maximize expected profits.  By comparison, it is unclear 
if the government wants its firms to maximize expected profits.  Earning more revenues than 
costs is clearly a priority, but once this is accomplished the government would most likely want 
the firm to pursue other goals. 
  This lack of clarity in both the objective function of the government for the firms it owns 
and the set of feasible mechanisms the government can implement to compensate the firm’s 
management has a number of implications.  The first is that it is unlikely that the management of 
a government-owned firm will produce and sell its output in a profit-maximizing manner.     
Different from a privately-owned firm, its owners are not demanding the highest possible return 
on their equity investments in the firm.  However, because a government-owned firm’s 
management has little incentive to maximize profits, it also has little incentive to produce in a 
least-cost manner. By the same token, this logic also implies that a government-owned firm has 
little incentive to attempt to raise prices beyond the level necessary to cover its total costs of 
production.  The second implication of this lack of clarity in objectives and feasible mechanisms 
is that the firm’s management now has the flexibility to pursue a number of other goals besides 
minimizing the total cost of producing the output demanded by consumers.    
  Viewed from the perspective of the overall market design problem, one advantage of 
government-ownership is that the pricing goals of the firm do not directly contradict the market 
designer’s goal of the lowest possible prices consistent with the long-term financial viability of 
the industry.  In the case of private ownership, the pricing incentives of the firm’s management  
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directly contradict the interests of consumers.  As discussed in the previous section, the firm’s 
management wants to raise prices above the marginal cost of the last unit produced, because of 
the desire of the firm’s owners to receive the highest possible return on their investment in the 
company.  The desire of privately owned firms to maximize expected profits leads to pricing 
incentives that directly contradict the goals of the market design process.  Unless the firm faces 
sufficient competition from other suppliers, which from the discussion of Figure 1 is equivalent 
to saying that the firm faces a sufficiently elastic residual demand curve, this desire to raise the 
market price will yield market outcomes that cause significant harm to consumers.    
  However, it is important to emphasize that prices set by a government-owned firm may 
cause at least as much harm to consumers as prices that reflect the exercise of unilateral market 
power if the incentives for least-cost production by the government-owned firm are sufficiently 
muted and the firm is required to set a price that at least recovers all of its incurred production 
costs.   Although these prices may appear more benign because they only recover the actual costs 
incurred by the government-owned firm, they are in fact more harmful from a societal welfare 
perspective than the same level of prices set by a privately owned firm.  This is because the 
privately owned firm has a strong incentive to produce in a technically and allocatively efficient 
manner and any positive difference between total revenues paid by consumers and the minimum 
cost of producing the output sold is economic profit or producer surplus.  However, for the case 
of the government-owned firm there is another reason why the firm is required to raise its price.  
That is because it is producing in a technically and allocatively inefficient manner, which is 
socially wasteful and therefore yields a reduced level of producer surplus relative to the case of a 
privately owned firm.  Because both outcomes, by assumption, have consumers paying the same 
price, the level of consumer surplus is unchanged across the two ownership structures, so that the 
level of total surplus is reduced as a result of government ownership. 
  Figure 2 illustrates this point.  The step function labeled MCp is the incurred marginal 
cost curve for the privately owned firm and the step function labeled MCg is the incurred 
marginal cost curve for the government-owned firm.  I make the distinction between incurred 
and minimum cost to account for the fact that the management of the government-owned firm 
has less of an incentive to produce at minimum cost than does the privately owned firm.  In this 
example, I assume the reason for this difference in marginal cost curves is that the government- 
19 
 
owned firm uses more units of each input to produce the same level of output than does the 
privately owned firm.  Suppose that the profit-maximizing level of output for the privately 
owned firm, given the residual demand curve plotted in Figure 2, is Q
*, with a price of P
*.  
Suppose the government-owned firm behaves as if it were a price-taker given its marginal cost 
curve and this residual demand curve, and assume that this price is also equal to the firm’s 
average incurred cost at Q
*, AC(Q
*).  I have drawn the figure so that the intersection of the 
marginal cost curve of the government-owned firm with this residual demand curve occurs at the 
same price and quantity pair.  However, as noted above, the government-owned firm uses much 
more of society’s scarce resources to produce Q
* than the privately owned firm.  Consequently, 
the additional benefit that society receives from having the privately owned firm produce the 
good, even though it is exercising significant unilateral market power, is the shaded area between 
the two marginal cost curves in Figure 2.  This example demonstrates that even though the 
privately owned firm exercises all available unilateral market power, if the incentives for 
efficient production by government-owned firms are sufficiently muted, it may be preferable 
from the market designer’s and society’s perspective to tolerate some exercise of unilateral 
market power, rather than adopt a regime with government-owned firms setting prices equal to 
an extremely inefficiently incurred marginal cost or average cost of production. 
  The example given in Figure 2 may seem extreme, but there are a number of reasons why 
it is reasonable to believe that a government-owned firm faces far less pressure from its owners 
to produce in a least-cost manner than its privately owned counterpart.  For example, poorly run 
privately-owned companies can go bankrupt.  If a firm’s creditors are not paid, they can demand 
to have the firm liquidate its assets to pay them.  If a firm consistently earns revenues less than 
its production costs, the firm’s owners and creditors will force the firm to liquidate its assets and 
exit the industry.  The experience from both developed and developing countries is that poorly 
run government-owned companies rarely go out of business.  Governments can and almost 
always do fund unprofitable companies from general tax revenues.  Even in the United States, 
there are a number of examples of persistently unprofitable government-owned companies 
receiving subsidies long after the time that the vast majority of independent observers say that 
these firms should liquidate their assets and exit the industry.  Because government-owned  
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companies have this additional source of funds to cover their incurred production costs, they 
have significantly less incentive to produce in a least-cost manner. 
 
3.  Lessons for Designing a Competitive Wholesale Market from Developed 
Countries 
 
Although there have been some highly publicized wholesale electricity market design failures in 
developed countries, there have also been a number of wholesale market design successes from 
ESI restructuring processes over the past fifteen years.  This section will describe the important 
positive lessons from these reforms.  This involves describing five essential initial conditions 
necessary to have a competitive wholesale electricity market.  Because countries have and will 
continue to implement wholesale markets without these initial conditions in place, I will describe 
a number of safeguards that limit the potential harm to consumers from implementing ESI 
reforms with less-than-optimal initial conditions. I will also discuss the long-term implications of 
these safeguards, because many of them provide short-term protection but hinder long-term 
market efficiency. 
 
3.1. Essential Features of a Competitive Wholesale Market 
 
As has been emphasized by a number of observers, spot electricity markets are extremely 
susceptible to the exercise of unilateral market power.  Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002, 
hereafter BBW) present estimates of the extent of unilateral market power exercised in the 
California electricity market over the period June 1998 to October 2000.  Joskow and Kahn 
(2002) perform a similar analysis that focuses on the events of the summer of 2000 in the 
California market and the issue of withdrawing capacity from the market to exercise unilateral 
market power.  Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2002) compare the extent of unilateral market 
power exercised in the California market to that in the PJM (portions of Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey and Maryland as well as Delaware and Washington, D.C.) and ISO (Independent System 
Operator)-New England wholesale markets.  The major conclusion from this three-market 
analysis is that unilateral market power is common to all of these wholesale markets, particularly  
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during system conditions when the demand for electricity is sufficiently high that a large fraction 
of the within-control-area generating capacity is needed to meet this demand. 
  As discussed in Section 2, it is impossible to eliminate the incentive that suppliers in a 
competitive electricity market have to exercise unilateral market power.  The best that a market 
designer can hope to do is reduce it.  Using the framework of Section 2, this means the market 
designer must recognize the individual rationality constraint that the firm will maximize profits 
given the market rules and actions taken by the firm’s competitors.  As the discussion of Figure 1 
demonstrates, the market designer reduces the incentive the firm has to exercise unilateral market 
power by facing the firm with a residual demand curve that is as elastic as possible.  Although I 
do not expect the firm’s desire to maximize profits to be diminished by facing it with a more 
elastic residual demand curve, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the more elastic the supplier’s residual 
demand curve, the less the firm’s unilateral profit-maximizing actions are able to raise the 
market-clearing price.  Consequently, the goal of designing a competitive electricity market is 
straightforward:  Face all suppliers with as elastic as possible residual demand curves during as 
many hours of the year as possible. 
  Wolak (2003b) presents evidence consistent with this market design goal.  Using bid data 
from the California Independent System Operators’s (CAISO) real-time electricity market, he 
computes, ,jh, the elasticity of the hourly residual demand curve for hour h facing supplier j 
evaluated at the hourly market-clearing price for each of the five large in-state suppliers to the 
California electricity market—AES/Williams, Duke, Dynegy, Mirant and Reliant—for the period 
June 1 to September 30 for 1998, 1999 and 2000.  Consistent with the market-wide estimates of 
the extent of unilateral market power exercised presented in BBW, Wolak (2003b) demonstrates 
that for all of these suppliers the average hourly value of 1/,jh was higher in 2000 relative to 1998 
and 1999.  This result implies that the ability of each of these five suppliers to raise market prices 
by bidding to maximize their profits from selling electricity in the CAISO’s real-time market was 
much greater in 2000 relative to the previous two years.   The average hourly value of 1/,jh in 
1998 was somewhat higher than the same value in 1999, indicating the unilateral profit-
maximizing actions of suppliers to the California market in 1999 were less able to raise market 
prices than in 1998.  This result is consistent with the market-wide estimates of the extent of 
unilateral market power exercised in BBW for 1998 versus 1999.  
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  There are five primary mechanisms for increasing the elasticity of the residual demand 
curve faced by a supplier in a wholesale electricity market.  The first is divestiture of capacity 
owned by this firm into a larger number of independent suppliers.  Second is the magnitude and 
distribution across suppliers of financial forward contracts to supply electricity to load-serving 
entities.   Third is the extent to which final consumers are active participants in the wholesale 
electricity market.  Fourth is the extent to which the transmission network has sufficient capacity 
to deliver electricity to all locations in the transmission network so that each firm faces sufficient 
competition from other suppliers.   The last is the extent to which regulatory oversight of the 
wholesale market provides strong incentives for all market participants to fulfill their contractual 
obligations and obey the market rules.  We now discuss each of these mechanisms for increasing 
the elasticity of the residual demand curve facing a supplier. 
3.1.1.  Divestiture of Suppliers 
To understand how the divestiture of a given amount of capacity into a larger number of 
independent suppliers can impact the slope of the residual demand a firm faces, consider the 
following simple example.  Suppose there are ten equal-sized firms, each of which owns 1,000 
MW of capacity and that the total demand in the hourly wholesale market is equal to 9,500 
MWh.  Each firm knows that at least 500 MW of its capacity is needed to meet this demand, 
regardless of the actions of its competitors.  Specifically, if the remaining nine firms bid all 1,000 
MW of their capacity into the market, the tenth firm has a residual demand of at least 500 MWh 
at every bid price.  Mathematically, this means the value of the residual demand facing the firm, 
DR(p), is positive at pmax, the highest possible bid price that a supplier can submit.  When 
DR(pmax)  > 0, the firm is said to be pivotal, meaning that at least  DR(pmax) of its capacity is 
needed to serve demand.  Figure 3 provides an example of this phenomenon.  Let SO1(p) 
represent the bid supply curve of all other firms besides the firm under consideration and Qd the 
level of demand.  Figure 3(b) shows that the firm is pivotal for DR1(pmax) units of output, which 
in this example is equal to 500 MWh.  In this circumstance, the firm is guaranteed total revenues 
of at least DR1(pmax)*pmax, which it can achieve by bidding all of its capacity in at pmax.   
  To see the impact on a firm’s residual demand curve from requiring it to sell capacity, 
suppose that the firm in Figure 3 was forced to sell off 500 MW of its capacity to a new entrant  
23 
 
to the market.  This implies that the maximum supply of all other firms is now equal to 9,500 
MWh, the original 9,000 MWh plus the additional 500 MWh divested, which is exactly equal to 
the level of demand.  This means that the firm is no longer pivotal, because its residual demand 
is equal to zero at pmax.  Figure 3(a) draws a new bid supply curve of all other market participants 
besides the firm under consideration, SO2(p).  For every price, I would expect this curve to lie to 
the right of SO1(p), the original bid supply curve.  Figure 3(b) plots the resulting residual demand 
curve for the firm using SO2(p).  This residual demand curve, DR2(p), crosses the vertical axis at 
pmax, so that the elasticity of the residual demand curve facing the firm is now finite for all 
feasible prices.  In contrast, for the case of DR1(p), the residual demand pre-divestiture, the firm 
faces an inelastic demand of at least DR1(pmax ) for all prices in the neighborhood of pmax. 
  This is an example of a general phenomenon associated with structural divestiture: the 
firm now faces a more elastic residual demand curve, which causes it to bid more aggressively 
into the wholesale electricity market.  This more aggressive bidding by the divested firm then 
presents all other suppliers with flatter residual demand curves, so they now find it optimal to 
submit flatter bid supply curves, which implies a flatter residual demand curve for the firm under 
consideration.  Even in those cases when divestiture does not stop a supplier from being pivotal, 
the residual demand curve facing the firm that has less capacity should still be more elastic 
because more supply has been added to SO(p), the aggregate bid supply function of all other 
firms besides the firm under consideration.  This implies a smaller value for the firm’s residual 
demand at all prices, as shown in Figure 3. 
3.1.2.  Forward Contracts and Vesting Contracts 
Much has been made of the importance of forward contracts to manage the risk of spot price 
volatility.  However, in electricity markets forward contracts serve an even more important role. 
They make it profit-maximizing for suppliers to bid more aggressively in the spot electricity 
market.  This point is demonstrated in detail in Wolak (2000).  
  To understand the impact of forward contract commitments on supplier bidding behavior 
it is important to understand the obligations a forward contract for energy imposes on a supplier.  
Usually forward contracts are signed between suppliers and load-serving entities.  These 
contracts typically give the load-serving entity the right to buy a fixed quantity of energy at a 
given location at a negotiated price.   Viewed from this perspective, a forward contract for the  
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supply of electricity obligates the seller to provide insurance against price volatility at a pre-
specified location in the transmission network for a pre-specified quantity of energy.  The seller 
of the forward contract does not have to produce energy from its own generating facilities to 
provide this price insurance to the purchaser of the forward contract.  However, one way for the 
seller of the forward financial contract to avoid any price risk is to provide the contract quantity 
from its own generation units.  This guarantees the firm will earn the difference between the 
forward contract price, PC, and its marginal cost, MC, times its contract quantity, QC, in variable 
profits (revenues in excess of variable costs) from the forward contract.  This logic leads to 
another extremely important point about forward contracts that is not often fully understood by 
participants in a wholesale electricity market.  Delivering electricity from a seller’s own 
generation units is not always a profit-maximizing strategy given the supplier’s forward contract 
obligations.  This is also the reason why forward contracts provide strong incentives for suppliers 
to bid more aggressively (flatter bid supply functions) into the spot electricity market, which then 
leaves all other suppliers with more elastic residual demand curves. 
  To see this point, consider the following example taken from Wolak (2000).  Let DR(p) 
equal the residual demand curve faced by the supplier with the forward contract obligation QC at 
a price of PC and a marginal cost of MC.  For simplicity, I assume that the firm’s marginal cost 
curve is constant, but this simplification does not impact any of the conclusions.  The variable 
profits the firm earns during this hour are equal to  
  Β(p) = (DR(p)-QC)(p - MC) + (PC - MC)QC.  (2) 
The first term in (2) is equal to profit or loss the firm earns from buying or selling energy in the 
spot market at a price of p.  The second term in (2) is the variable profits the firm earns from 
selling QC units of energy at PC.  As discussed in Section 2, the firm’s objective is to bid into 
the spot market in order to set a market price, p, that maximizes Β(p).  Because forward contracts 
are, by definition, signed in advance of the operation of the spot market, from the perspective of 
bidding into the spot market, the firm treats (PC - MC)QC as a fixed payment it will receive 
regardless of the spot price, p. Consequently, the firm can only impact the first term through its 
bidding behavior in the spot market.  
 Because  DR(p) is downward sloping, it is possible if the market price is high, the firm 
will sell less energy than its forward contract commitments.  If the price at which DR(p) is less  
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than QC is greater than MC, the firm incurs losses on the difference between QC and DR(p) 
times the difference between p and MC.  Therefore, a supplier with a forward contract obligation 
of QC has a very strong incentive to submit bids that set prices below its marginal cost if it 
believes that DR(p) will be less than QC.   This is because the supplier is effectively a net buyer 
of QC - DR(p) units of electricity, because it has already sold QC units in a forward contract.  
Consequently, it is profit-maximizing for the firm to want to purchase this net demand at the 
lowest possible price.  It can either do this by producing the power from its own units at a cost of 
MC or purchasing the additional energy from the spot market.  If the firm can push the market 
price below its marginal cost, then it is profit-maximizing for the firm to meet its forward 
obligations by purchasing power from the spot market rather than paying MC to produce it.   
Consequently, if suppliers have substantial forward contract obligations, they have extremely 
strong incentives to keep market prices very low until the level of energy they actually produce is 
greater than their forward contract quantity. 
  The competition-enhancing benefits of forward contract commitments from suppliers can 
be seen more easily by defining DRC(p) = DR(p) - QC, the net-of-forward contract residual 
demand facing the firm and F =  (PC - MC)QC, the variable profits from forward contract sales.  
In this notation, Β(p) = DRC(p)(p - MC) + F, which  has exactly the same structure (except for 
F) as the firm’s profits from selling electricity if it had no forward contract commitments.  The 
only difference is that DR(p) replaces DRC(p) in the expression for the supplier’s variable profits.  
Consequently, profit-maximizing behavior implies that the firm will submit bids to set a price in 
the spot market that satisfies equation (1) with DR(p) replaced by DRC(p).   This implies the 
following relationship between P
c, the expected profit-maximizing price, the firm’s marginal 
cost of production, MC, and ,
c, the elasticity of the net-of- forward-contract-quantity residual 










c)).  Because DRC(p) = DR(p) - QC, this implies that at the same 
market price, p, and residual demand curve, DR(p), the absolute value of the elasticity of the net-
of-forward-contract-quantity residual demand curve is always greater than the absolute value of 
the elasticity of the residual demand curve. Simple proof of this result follows from the fact that  
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DRCΝ(p) = DRΝ(p) for all prices and QC > 0, so that by re-writing the expressions for ,
c and ,, 
we obtain: 
 |  ,
c  | = | DRΝ(p)*(p/[DR(p) - QC]) |> | , |  = | DRΝ(p)*(p/DR(p)) |.  (5) 
Moreover, as long as DR(p) - QC > 0, the larger the value of QC, the greater is the difference 
between  ,
c and ,, and the smaller is the expected profit-maximizing percentage mark-up of the 
market price above the firm’s marginal cost of producing the last unit of electricity that it 
supplies with forward contract commitments versus no forward contract commitments.   This 
result demonstrates that it is always unilateral profit-maximizing, for the same underlying 
residual demand curve, for the supplier to set a lower price relative to its marginal cost if it has 
forward contract commitments. 
  This incentive to bid more aggressively in the spot market if a supplier has substantial 
forward contracts also has implications for how a fixed quantity of forward contract 
commitments should be allocated among suppliers to maximize the benefits of these contracts to 
the competitiveness of the spot market.  Because a firm with forward contract obligations will 
bid more aggressively in the spot market, this implies that all of its competitors will also face 
more elastic residual demand curves and therefore find it unilaterally profit-maximizing to bid 
more aggressively in the spot market.  This more aggressive bidding will leave all other firms 
with more elastic residual demand curves, which should therefore make these firms bid more 
aggressively in the spot market.  
   This virtuous cycle with respect to the benefits of forward contracting implies that a 
given amount of forward contracts will have the greatest competitive benefits if it is spread out 
among all of the suppliers in the market roughly proportional to their generation capacity 
ownership shares.  For example, if there are five firms and each of them owns 1,000 MW of 
capacity, then forward contract commitments should be allocated equally across the firms to 
maximize the competitive benefits.  If one firm owned twice the capacity of other firms, then it 
should have roughly twice the forward contract commitments to load-serving entities that the 
other suppliers have. 
  Because of the spot market benefits of substantial amounts of forward contract 
commitments between suppliers and load-serving entities, most wholesale electricity markets 
begin operation with a large fraction of the final demand covered under forward contracts.  If a  
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substantial amount of capacity is initially controlled by government-owned or privately-owned 
monopolies, the regulator or market designer usually orders that most of these assets be sold to 
new entrants to create a more competitive wholesale market.  These sales typically take place 
with forward contract commitments on the part of the new owner of the generation capacity to 
supply a substantial fraction of the expected output of the unit to load-serving entities at some 
pre-set price.  These contracts are typically called vesting contracts, because they are assigned to 
the unit as a pre-condition for its sale. For example, if a 500 MW unit owned by the former 
monopolist were being sold, the regulator would assign a forward contract obligation on the new 
owner to supply 400 MW of energy each hour at some previously agreed upon price to one of the 
load-serving entities. 
  Vesting contracts accomplish several goals.  The first is to provide price certainty for 
load-serving entities for a significant fraction of their wholesale energy needs.  The second is to 
provide revenue certainty to the new owner of the generating facility.  With such a forward 
contract, the new owner of the generation unit in our example already has a revenue stream each 
hour equal to the contract price times 400 MWh.   These two aspects of vesting contracts protect 
suppliers and loads from the vagaries of spot market outcomes, because both parties receive or 
pay the spot price for production or consumption beyond the contract quantity.  Finally, the 
existence of this forward contract obligation has the beneficial impacts on the competitiveness of 
the spot energy market described above.   
The major cause of the California electricity crisis is the fact that California’s three large 
load-serving entities purchased 100 percent of their total energy and ancillary service 
requirements from the day-ahead and shorter-horizon spot markets.  When the amount of imports 
from the Pacific Northwest was substantially reduced as a result of lower water availability 
during the late spring and summer of 2000, the fossil fuel suppliers found themselves facing the 
significantly less elastic residual demand curves for their output documented in Wolak (2003b).  
This fact made the unilateral profit-maximizing mark-up of price above the marginal cost of 
producing electricity substantially higher during the summer and autumn of 2000 than it had 
been during the previous two years of the market.  Moreover, particularly during the latter part of 
the autumn of 2000, there is strong evidence that the marginal cost of highest cost unit operating 
in California increased substantially relative to the early part of 2000 and the previous two years.  
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During the vast majority of hours of the year, natural gas-fired units set the price in 
California. During the latter part of 2000, the price of natural gas increased substantially relative 
to the levels that existed in early 2000 and the previous two years.  These substantially higher 
natural gas prices resulted in much higher values for the marginal cost of the highest cost unit 
operating in California—market price under the assumption that all suppliers were unable to 
exercise any unilateral market power. Applying hourly values of the residual demand facing the 
five large suppliers in the latter parts of 1999 and 1998 to these higher marginal costs would 
have led to substantially higher prices in 2000.  The combination of these higher natural gas 
prices and the substantially smaller average hourly values of elasticity of the residual demand 
curve facing each of the five large suppliers in the California electricity market in the latter part 
of 2000, calculated in Wolak (2003b), led to even higher prices during the latter part of 2000.   
Wolak (2003b) provides a detailed diagnosis of causes and consequences of the 
California electricity crisis and concludes with two very important lessons that are very relevant 
to LACs.  The first is the importance of an active forward market for electricity.  Although 
vesting contracts are one way to foster an active forward market during the initial stages of a 
restructuring process, they are not essential to success of a restructuring process.  What is 
essential, particularly for a market that normally obtains a substantial fraction of its electricity 
from hydroelectricity, is that load-serving entities purchase a substantial fraction of their energy 
needs, certainly more than 80 percent, in the forward market at least a year in advance of 
delivery.  The second lesson is the necessity of a credible regulatory process that sets well-
defined boundaries on acceptable market outcomes, defines those outcomes that justify 
regulatory invention, clarifies in advance the form of this regulatory intervention, and follows 
through with these pre-commitments should the standards for acceptable market outcomes be 
violated. 
3.1.3.  Involving Final Demand 
If there were no variation in demand or supply across hours of the day, days of the week or 
weeks of the year, it would be possible to build enough generation capacity to ensure that all 
demand in every hour could be served at some fixed price.  However, the reality of electricity 
consumption and generation units and transmission network operations is that demand and  
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supply vary over time, often in an unpredictable manner.  This implies that there is always some 
likelihood that available capacity will be insufficient to meet demand.   
  Given available generation capacity, there are two ways of eliminating this imbalance: 
either price must be increased so as to choke off demand, or demand must be rationed.   
Rationing is clearly an extremely inefficient way to ensure that supply equals demand.  Many 
consumers willing to purchase electricity at the prevailing price are unable to do so.  Moreover, 
as has been discovered by politicians in all countries where rationing has occurred, the backlash 
associated with rationing can be devastating to those in power.  Moreover, the indirect costs of 
rationing on the level of economic activity can be substantial.  In particular, preparing for and 
dealing with rationing periods causes substantial losses in economic activity.   
  A far superior approach to dealing with a shortfall of available supply relative to the level 
of demand at the prevailing price is to allow this retail price to rise to the level necessary to cause 
a sufficient number of consumers to reduce their consumption so that supply and demand 
balance.  Although this might seem like a revolutionary concept in the electricity supply 
industry, this is precisely how markets for all other products operate.   
  This concept is even less revolutionary when one recognizes that from a system 
reliability perspective, customers paying the hourly price of wholesale electricity for their hourly 
consumption is not fundamentally different from generation unit owners being paid according to 
the hourly price of electricity for their hourly production.  Let D(p) equal the consumer’s hourly 
demand for electricity as a function of the hourly price of electricity.  Define SN(p) = D(0) - 
D(p), where D(0) is the consumer’s demand for electricity at an hourly price equal to zero.  The 
function SN(p) is the consumer’s true willingness supply curve for “negawatts.”  Because D(p) is 
a downward-sloping function of p, SN(p) is an upward-sloping function of p.  A generator with a 
marginal cost curve equal to SN(p) has the ability to provide the same reliability benefits to this 
consumer.  However, as discussed above, an electricity supplier has the incentive to maximize 
the profits it earns from selling electricity in the spot market given its marginal cost function.  In 
contrast, I would expect an industrial or commercial consumer with a true supply curve of 
negawatts, SN(p), to bid her willingness to supply negawatts into the spot market to maximize 
the profits associated with selling her final output, which would imply demand-bidding to reduce 
the market price.  Consequently, even though the generator and consumer have the same true  
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willingness to supply megawatt and negawatts, respectively, each of them will use this true 
supply curve in a different manner.  The supplier will use it to exercise market power on the 
supply side to raise market prices, and the consumer will use it to exercise market power on the 
demand side of the market to reduce the price it pays for electricity.  Wolak (2001) describes 
how a load-serving entity with some consumers facing the hourly wholesale price or a large 
consumer facing the hourly price could exercise market power on the demand side to reduce the 
average price it pays for a fixed daily supply of electricity consumed over longer period of time. 
  Besides allowing the system operator more flexibility in managing demand and supply 
imbalances, the presence of some consumers that alter their consumption in response to the 
hourly wholesale price also significantly benefits the competitiveness of the spot market.  Figure 
4 illustrates this point.  The two residual demand curves are computed for the same value of 
SO(p). One, QD, is perfectly inelastic. The other, QD(p), is price elastic.  As shown in the 
diagram, the slope of the resulting residual demand curve using QD(p) is always flatter than the 
slope of the residual demand curve using QD.   Following the logic used for the case of forward 
contracts, it can be demonstrated that for the same price and same value of residual demand, the 
elasticity of the residual demand curve using QD(p), is always greater than the one using QD, 
because the slope of the one using QD(p) is equal to DRΝ(p) =  QDΝ(p) - SOΝ(p), which is 
larger in absolute value than SOΝ(p), the slope of the residual demand curve using QD.  
Consequently, the competition benefit of having final consumers pay the hourly wholesale price 
is that all suppliers will face more elastic residual demand curves, which will cause them all to 
bid more aggressively into the spot market. 
  Politicians and policymakers often express concern that subjecting consumers to real-
time price risk will introduce too much volatility into their monthly bill.  These concerns are, for 
the most part, unfounded as well as misplaced.  Some entity must manage wholesale spot price 
risk.  Just because a regulator sets a fixed price or pattern of prices throughout the day (time-of-
use prices), some entity must still ensure that over the course of the month or year, the retailer’s 
total revenues less transmission, distribution and supply costs, must cover total wholesale energy 
costs.  If the regulator sets this fixed price too low relative to the current wholesale price, then 
either the retailer or the government must pay the difference.  If this revenues shortfall relative to 
costs continues, eventually the government must make up the difference because it has the ability  
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to impose taxes to fund its expenditures.  However, these tax revenues are also collected from 
consumers of electricity, although not generally in proportion to their consumption of electricity. 
  This is the lesson learned by the citizens of California during the period from May 2000 
to June 2001.  When average wholesale prices rose above the average wholesale price implicit in 
the frozen retail price California consumers paid for electricity, retailers initially made up the 
difference.  Eventually, these companies threatened to declare bankruptcy in the case of Southern 
California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric, and in fact declared bankruptcy in the case of 
Pacific Gas and Electric, so that the state of California had to take over purchasing wholesale 
power at even higher prices.  The California experience demonstrates that the option to purchase 
all retail electricity demand at a price that does not vary with hourly system conditions is 
extremely valuable to consumers, and if exercised it can be extremely costly to the government 
that must ultimately finance it. 
  This is a restatement of a standard prediction from the theory of stock option valuation: 
the price of a call option on a stock increases with the volatility of the underlying security.  
However, the fact that consumers have the option to switch to this fixed-price, full-requirements 
rate that completely shields them from any spot price risk in their electricity purchases (but not in 
their tax payments) makes wholesale prices more volatile.  This follows from the fact that a less 
elastic wholesale electricity demand increases price volatility.  Clearly, a more efficient way to 
manage electricity spot price risk is to treat consumers the same way that generation unit owners 
are treated because, as discussed above, consumers paying hourly prices have the potential to 
provide the same level of grid reliability benefits as generation unit owners. 
  Perhaps the most important, but most often ignored, lesson from electricity restructuring 
processes in developed countries is the necessity of treating load and generation symmetrically.  
Unfortunately, very few developed countries do this, which may explain why few of them have 
seen consumers realize significant benefits from ESI restructuring.  Symmetric treatment of load 
and generation means that unless a retail consumer signs a forward contract with an electricity 
retailer the default wholesale price the customer pays for all of his consumption is the hourly 
wholesale price.  This is precisely the same wholesale price risk that generation unit owners face.  
Unless they sign a forward contract with a load-serving entity or some other market participant, 
the price they receive for any real-time energy production is the hourly spot price.   Just as very  
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few suppliers are willing to risk selling all of their output in the spot market, I would expect 
consumers to have similar preferences against too much reliance on the spot market and would 
therefore be willing to sign a long-term contract for a large fraction of their expected hourly 
consumption during each hour of the month.  For example, a residential consumer might 
purchase a pre-specified daily or weekly energy profile at a fixed price for the next 12 months.  
This customer would then be able to sell energy she has purchased but does not consume during 
any hour at the hourly wholesale price or purchase any power she needs beyond the contract 
quantity at that same price.  This type of pricing arrangement would result in a significantly less 
volatile monthly electricity bill than if the consumer made all of his purchases at the hourly 
wholesale price.   
If all customers purchased according to this sort of pricing plan, then there would be no 
residual spot price risk for the government to manage using tax revenues.  Instead, all consumers 
manage the risk of high wholesale prices, according to their preferences for taking on spot price 
risk.  Those willing to take on more spot price risk could do by purchasing a smaller fraction of 
their expected hourly demand as a fixed-price contract.  Moreover, because all consumers have 
an incentive to reduce their consumption during high-priced periods and shift it to lower-priced 
periods, wholesale prices are likely to be significantly less volatile.  Rather than continuing to 
consume when wholesale prices rise, they now see this very high spot price as the opportunity 
cost of using electricity for all of their consumption, with the important difference that if they 
consume less than their forward contract quantity, they are paid this very high price for each 
KWh they do not consume below that level.   
  Symmetric treatment of load and generation does not preclude a customer from 
purchasing a fixed-price full requirements contract for all of the electricity he might consume in 
a month.  It only imposes the requirement that the consumer pay the full cost of supplying this 
product.  The wholesale energy cost portion of such a contract should be substantially higher 
than the expected average wholesale price over the duration of the contract because the supplier 
of the contract is providing insurance against fluctuations in the wholesale price for a quantity of 
energy that is determined at the discretion of the customer, meaning that there is both price and 
quantity risk associated with providing a full-requirement, fixed-price contract.  To get an idea of 
the risk involved, imagine a gasoline retailer making a promise to its customers that they can  
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purchase as much gasoline as they would like at a fixed price for an entire year.  Given the 
volatility in wholesale gasoline prices, the premium (above the expected average price) that a 
retailer would require to offer such a product should be quite high.  This same sort of price 
premium should also exist for full requirements, fixed-price contracts for electricity.   
Having a regulatory process determine the fixed-price, full-requirements rate runs into 
the following problems. If the regulatory process sets this price too low, then too many 
customers will choose this rate and the retailer will be unable to procure all of the wholesale 
energy necessary to supply these contracts and at wholesale prices that allow full cost recovery.  
In the extreme case this is the California problem described above.  However, a number of 
markets in the eastern United States have experienced less extreme versions of this problem. 
Alternatively, if the regulatory process sets this price too high, then too few customers will select 
this supply arrangement.  The cost to customers of setting this rate too high may be very low or 
even zero, if retailers are allowed to compete in offering fixed-price, full-requirements supply 
contracts and no customer ultimate elects to take supply at this regulated rate.  Consequently, one 
solution to the problem of providing sufficient spot price protection for customers in an 
environment with retail competition is for the regulator to determine periodically a slack upper 
bound on the rate for a fixed-price, full-requirements contract of a fixed duration and make it a 
pre-condition to be an electricity retailer to offer such a contract along with all of the other 
supply contracts the retailer would like to offer. 
  Borenstein (2003) discusses a number of technical issues associated with involving final 
demand in the retail market.  One roadblock to symmetric treatment of load and generation for 
all electricity customers that Borenstein treats is the cost of installing the necessary metering 
technology at the household level to allow consumption to be measured on an hourly versus 
monthly basis.  Wolak (2001) presents evidence for California that suggests that these costs 
could be paid for by the lower wholesale electricity prices that would result from the more 
competitive wholesale market brought about by the symmetric treatment of load and generation.  
Green and McDaniel (1998) perform a social cost-benefit analysis of the transition to retail 
competition for residential consumers in the England and Wales electricity market where any 
consumer that wishes to switch from their default supplier must install a half-hourly meter.   
Green and McDaniel analyzed a number of likely scenarios for the impact of retail competition  
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on residential consumers and electricity suppliers and found that the net benefits, if any, are 
likely to come later as more consumers participate in the retail market and competitive pressures 
reduce retail prices.  Nevertheless, all of these researchers argue that there are significant benefits 
net of metering costs from involving commercial and industrial consumers in the wholesale 
market.  
3.1.4.  Economic Reliability versus Engineering Reliability of a Transmission Network 
The presence of a wholesale electricity market changes the definition of what constitutes a 
reliable transmission network.   As shown in Section 2, in order for it to be profit-maximizing for 
a generation unit owner to submit a bid supply curve close to its marginal cost curve, the supplier 
must face a sufficiently elastic residual demand curve for its energy.  For this to be the case, 
there must be enough transmission capacity into the geographic area served by this unit owner so 
that any attempts it makes to raise local prices will result in enough lost sales to make such a 
bidding strategy unprofitable.   
  I introduce the concept of an economically reliable transmission network as one with 
sufficient capacity so that each location in the network faces sufficient competition from distant 
generation to cause the local unit owners to compete with distant generators rather than withhold 
energy to cause congestion into the region and create a local monopoly market.   In the former 
vertically integrated monopoly regime, transmission expansions were undertaken to ensure the 
engineering reliability of the transmission network.  A transmission network was deemed to be 
reliable from an engineering perspective if the vertically integrated monopolist that controlled all 
of the generation units in the control area could maintain a reliable electricity supply to 
consumers despite unexpected generation and transmission outages. 
  The value of increasing the transmission capacity between two points still depends on the 
extent to which this expansion allows the substitution of cheap generation in one area for 
expensive generation in the other area.  Under the vertically integrated monopoly regime, all 
differences across regions in wholesale energy charges were due to differences in the local costs 
of production for the geographic monopolist.  However, in the wholesale market regime, the 
extent of market power that can be exercised by firms at each location in the network can lead to 
much larger differences in payments for wholesale electricity across regions.  For example, even  
35 
 
if the difference in the variable cost of the highest cost units operating in two regions is less than 
$10/MWh, because firms in one area are able to exercise local market power, differences in the 
wholesale prices that consumers must pay across the two regions can be as high as the price cap 
on the real-time price of energy.  For example, during early 2000 in the California market when 
the price cap on the ISO’s real-time market was $750/MWh, because of congestion between the 
SP15 and NP15 zones, prices in the two zones differed by as much as $700/MWh. This occurred 
in despite the fact that the difference in the variable costs of the highest cost units operating in 
the two zones was less than $10/MWh. 
  This example demonstrates that a major benefit of transmission capacity in a wholesale 
market regime is that it limits the ability of generation unit owners to use transmission 
congestion to limit the number of competitors they face. More transmission capacity into a local 
area implies that local generating unit owners face more competition from distant generation for 
a larger fraction of their capacity.  Because these firms now face more competition from distant 
generation, they must bid more aggressively (lower prices) over a wider range of local demand 
realizations to sell the same amount of energy as they did before the transmission upgrade.  In all 
cases, this more aggressive bidding brought about by the transmission upgrade will lower 
average wholesale energy prices on the congested side of the interface.  Moreover, to the extent 
that the probability of congestion in one direction on an interface is approximately equal to the 
probability of congestion in the opposite direction, the reduced opportunities for suppliers to 
exercise market power on both sides of the interface as a result of a transmission upgrade could 
reduce average wholesale prices at both locations. 
  The opportunity for generation unit owners to impact location prices through their 
scheduling and bidding behavior creates another source of benefits of transmission upgrades in 
the wholesale market regime.  In the vertically integrated monopoly regime, one rationale for 
upgrades of the monopolist’s network was to manage the reliability risk associated with 
generation or transmission line outages.  For example, an upgrade could be justified by the logic 
that, if certain generating units became unavailable, the supply shortfall could be temporarily 
served with distant, but more expensive, generating units.  The reliability justification for such 
upgrades was that the cost of upgrading was less than the economic value created by the  
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additional electricity that the consumers were able to consume because of the transmission 
upgrade.  
  Under the competitive market regime generators may have an additional incentive, 
besides the fact that the unit is physically unable to operate, to declare their unit unavailable.  
They may find it profitable to create an artificial scarcity of generating capacity in a geographic 
area in order to increase the wholesale price they receive for the energy they do sell.  This 
incentive to withhold generating capacity did not exist in the regulated monopoly regime.  The 
monopolist was required by law to serve all demand at the regulated retail price.  Declaring a 
unit unable to operate would only reduce the monopolist’s expected profits, because it has the 
same load obligations, but now it has fewer units to choose from to serve these obligations.  
However, in the wholesale market regime, if a generator is able to raise the price it receives for 
its power by 100 percent by withholding (declaring unavailable to operate) a small fraction of its 
capacity, it will find this behavior profitable.  
  Consequently, in the wholesale market regime, reliability risk has an additional 
dimension because of the incentive for generation unit owners to withhold capacity from the 
market to increase prices if they do not face sufficient competition.  For example, few, if any, 
market observers would have predicted as late as August 2000 that the California ISO would 
experience a daily average of approximately 10,000 MW of generating units off-line during the 
eight-month period November, 2000 to May, 2001.  However, as discussed in Wolak (2003c), 
these outage levels made it considerably more straightforward for suppliers to raise the prices 
they received for the energy they actually produced.  Additional transmission capacity can render 
physical withholding strategies, which may lead to load curtailments, less profitable and 
therefore less likely to occur. 
    Understanding how transmission upgrades can increase the elasticity of the residual 
demand curve a supplier faces requires only a slight modification of the discussion surrounding 
Figure 3. Suppose that 9,500 MWh of demand is all located on the other side of a transmission 
line with 9,000 MW of capacity, and the supplier under consideration owns 1000 MW of 
generation local to the demand.  Suppose there are 12 firms, each of which owns 1,000 MW of 
capacity located on the other side of the interface.  In this case, the local supplier is pivotal for 
500 MWh of energy because local demand is 9,500 MWh, but only 9,000 MWh of energy can  
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get into the local area because of transmission constraints.  The assumption of 12 firms, each of 
which owns 1,000 MW of capacity, implies that there is plenty of generation available to serve 
the local demand. It just cannot get into the region because of transmission constraints.  This fact 
allows a re-interpretation of SO1(p) in Figure 3 as the bid supply curve of suppliers to sell energy 
along the 9,000 MW of transmission capacity. 
  Suppose the transmission line is now upgraded to 9,500 MW.  From the perspective of 
the local firm this results in a SO2(p) to serve the local demand that has an additional 500 MW, 
which means that the local supplier is no longer pivotal.  Before the upgrade the local supplier 
faced the residual demand curve DR1(p) in Figure 3 and after the upgrade it faces DR2(p), which 
is more elastic than DR1(p) at all price levels.  This is the mechanism by which transmission 
upgrades increase the competitiveness of wholesale electricity markets. 
3.1.5.  Specific Market Design Lessons from Developed Countries 
The three best-performing developed country wholesale electricity markets—Australia, England 
and Wales, and the Nordic countries—have achieved competitive wholesale markets by 
implementing one or more of the prescriptions described above for increasing the elasticity of the 
residual demand curves that suppliers face.  
  For example, since the start of the England and Wales market, the regulator has ordered a 
series of capacity divestitures from National Power and PowerGen, the two large fossil-fuel 
generation companies established at the start of the market.  In the State of Victoria in Australia, 
the generation capacity of the former monopoly supplier was sold at the plant level to ensure a 
sufficient number of competing suppliers.  There has been very little divestiture of the generation 
capacity owned by the large government-owned firms in the Nordic markets.  However, as 
discussed in Section 2, it is unclear whether these firms have as strong of an incentive to 
maximize profits as privately owned firms, which could explain why their dominant position in 
this market has not led to the exercise of excessive levels of unilateral market power. 
  In all three of these markets the vast majority of final demand is covered by long-term 
contracts.  It is difficult to get precise estimates of the extent of final demand that is covered by 
long-term contracts, because this information is considered proprietary.  However, 85 percent is 
a conservative lower boundary on the percent of final demand covered by long-term contracts for 
all of these markets.  Green (1999) presents estimates of these magnitudes for the mid-1990s for  
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the England and Wales electricity market.  Wolak (2000) discusses the situation in the Australian 
electricity market in the mid-1990s.  Wolak (1999) describes conditions in the Nordic market 
during the mid-1990s.  All of these authors find forward contract coverage percentages above 
this level. 
  The development of an active demand side has been much slower in all of these 
countries.  The England and Wales market and the Nordic market are the only countries that treat 
all load and generation symmetrically.  Australia is still in the process of moving forward with 
retail competition for all consumers. 
    Finally, all three countries have transmission networks that experience very little 
transmission congestion.  Although these transmission networks were not built to serve a 
competitive wholesale market, they are certainly far better suited to this task than the 
transmission networks that exist in the United States and many other developed countries that 
have restructured.  In England and Wales, National Grid in England and Wales is a privately-
owned firm that owns and operates the transmission network and the balancing mechanism for 
the England and Wales electricity market.  Since restructuring took place in the early 1990s, 
National Grid has undertaken a number of upgrades to its transmission network.  Because all of 
the states in Australia had their own government-owned monopoly ESIs before they restructured, 
the transmission networks in each of these states were designed to facilitate the delivery of 
electricity anywhere in the state. Consequently, the Australian market only experiences 
significant congestion across state boundaries.  The Nordic market has a similar history. Most of 
the Nordic countries built extensive transmission networks within their boundaries, so that 
congestion primarily occurs across national boundaries.  
  The fact that transmission congestion in these markets tends to occur primarily across 
national or state boundaries implies that for most hours of the year there is sufficient competition 
among suppliers within these geographic regions so that no single supplier is able to exercise 
significant unilateral market power.  Unfortunately, this is not the case in a number of LACs. 
The significantly higher frequency of congestion within most LAC countries gives rise to a 
problem that is increasingly relevant to the United States:  the local market power problem.  The 
United States experience has shown that until more transmission capacity or generation capacity 
can be built, regulatory intervention is the only solution to the local market power problem.   
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3.1.6.  Credible and Effective Regulatory Process 
Any attempt to establish a competitive market without the conditions outlined in the previous 
four sub-sections is bound to result in periods when the market fails in unintended ways.  This is 
particularly true in a market with significant local market power problems, as is likely to be the 
case in most LACs, because the country’s existing transmission network was not designed to 
achieve the economic reliability standard of a wholesale market regime.   For this reason, it is 
essential that there be a credible and effective regulatory process in place to mitigate substantial 
local market power and to monitor overall market performance to detect and correct market 
design flaws while they only cause limited consumer harm.  Unlike the case of the vertically 
integrated monopoly regime, the regulator must be forward-looking and fast-acting because, as 
emphasized in Section 2, markets provide extremely high-powered incentives for firm behavior, 
so it does not take very long for a wholesale electricity market to cause enormous consumer 
harm.  The California electricity crisis is an example of this phenomenon.  The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), the entity that regulates wholesale markets in the US, waited 
almost six months from the time it first became clear that there was substantial market power 
being exercised in the California market before it took action.  In addition, the regulatory 
intervention in December 2000 was so timid and ill-conceived that its result was to increase the 
rate at which consumer harm occurred.  Wolak, Nordhaus, and Shapiro (2000) discuss the likely 
impact, which also turned out to be the eventual impact, of the FERC’s December 2000 action. 
  An argument, based on the logic of the individual rationality constraint in Section 2, can 
even be made that an effective, credible and fast-acting regulatory process will increase the 
competitiveness of a wholesale electricity market. Specifically, if the regulator makes the 
penalties associated with any market rule violations more than the benefits that the market 
participant receives from violating that market rule, then suppliers will find it profit-maximizing 
to obey the market rules.  One lesson from the activities of many firms in the California market 
and other markets in the US is that if the cost of a market rule violation is less than the benefit 
the firm receives from violating the market rule, the firm will violate the market rule and pay the 
associated penalties as a cost of doing business because it earns a positive profit as a result of 
these actions.  
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  FERC’s failure to recognize this logic allowed the California electricity crisis to last as 
long as it did and become as big of a disaster as it did.   Since the start of the California market 
FERC refused to implement a system of financial penalties for market rule violations.  FERC 
only required firms to pay back the so-called ill-gotten gains from market rule violations.     
Clearly, this approach does not deter profitable market rule violations because the worst-case 
scenario for the firm is giving the profits back and the best case is being able to keep them.  
Unless the regulator is flawless at detecting market rule violations, under these circumstances it 
is expected profit-maximizing for the firm to violate market rules because it earns zero if it is 
caught violating the rules and positive profits when it does violate the market rules.  This is not 
the incentive for firm behavior a regulator wants to create.  Unfortunately, this is precisely the 
incentive that FERC created in the California market.  
  Any penalty mechanism the regulator implements should accomplish two goals.  First, 
firms should pay fines for market rule violations that at least exceed the financial damages its 
actions impose on other market participants. Second, this penalty should also be sufficient to 
make the expected amount of fines the firm must pay as a result of violating a market rule greater 
than the expected benefit the firm obtains from this violation.  This second constraint implies that 
the firm finds it profit-maximizing to comply with the market rules. A regulator that does not 
take decisive action to penalize market rule violations subject to these two constraints on the 
magnitude of fines imposed will soon find market rule violation more frequent, which will make 
it more costly for the ISO to manage the transmission network and operate its energy and 
ancillary services markets. 
  The experience of California and all other US states with wholesale markets provides 
another very valuable lesson for the design of an effective and credible regulatory process.   
Retail market regulatory policies must be consistent with wholesale market regulatory policies or 
wholesale market outcomes that are harmful to consumers and ultimately producers will occur.   
In the US this is a particularly challenging task because of the division of regulatory 
responsibilities: federal regulators are responsible for wholesale markets and state regulators are 
responsible for retail markets.  FERC regulates wholesale electricity markets throughout the US.  
It also has far more ambitious plans for wholesale electricity markets than any of the state public 
utilities commissions (PUCs) that regulate retail electricity markets within their boundaries.  As a  
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result, the state PUCs often enact retail market policies that work against many of the necessary 
features of a competitive wholesale market described above.  For example, they do not allow 
load and generation to be treated symmetrically.  In fact, they usually do all they can to shield 
consumers from electricity prices that vary over time or location.  In addition, state PUCs also 
tend to be skeptical of transmission upgrades to facilitate a more competitive wholesale market.  
Finally, they are often reluctant to give the load-serving entities they regulate sufficient freedom 
to engage in the necessary forward financial contracts to manage their wholesale market spot 
price risk effectively. Pairing these retail market policies with FERC’s very progressive 
wholesale market policies, which appear to assume that load-serving entities have substantial 
flexibility to forward contract and that final consumers are active participants in the wholesale 
market, can create disasters like California and the smaller, but still very costly, market failures 
that have occurred in the PJM, New York and New England ISOs. 
  However, the requirement to coordinate wholesale and retail market policies has a very 
important implication that should guide the reform process in both developed and developing 
countries.  If a country is not going to follow the five recommendations for a competitive 
wholesale market outlined in Section 3.1, then it must have substantially less ambitious goals for 
its wholesale electricity market.  
  For instance, if the political process is unwilling to divest enough of the capacity of the 
largest supplier to new entrants, this should place limits on the form and operation of the 
wholesale market.   If the regulator or political process is unwilling to allow retailers sufficient 
flexibility to manage their spot price risk or to require some or all final consumers to be treated 
symmetrically with generation unit owners in the wholesale market, this should constrain the 
type of wholesale market adopted.  These constraints on the wholesale market should not be 
relaxed until the regulatory constraints on achieving the five goals outlined above are relaxed.  
Similar logic applies to a country or region that refuses to consider the economic reliability 
benefits of transmission upgrades in the cost-benefit calculus for transmission upgrades.  Finally, 
a country that is unwilling to establish an independent regulator or regulatory body with the 
necessary statutory powers to become credible and effective should not even consider reforming 
its ESIs.  
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  The regulatory body is the guiding force for the reform process.  Unless the regulator is 
able to implement a local market power mitigation mechanism and to intervene and change 
harmful market rules or market structures, subject to judicial review, significant consumer harm 
is likely to occur at some point in the future.  Establishing a credible and effective regulatory 
process in a developing country with no history of regulation is perhaps the most technically and 
politically challenging task in establishing competitive wholesale electricity markets in LACs.  
 
3.2.  Implementing Workably Competitive Markets in Developed Countries 
 
Although the previous section provides a roadmap for designing a wholesale electricity market 
that is as competitive as possible given the set of available technologies for producing, 
transmitting and distributing electricity, all developed countries that have restructured their ESIs 
have introduced wholesale competition without one or all of the necessary features described in 
Section 3.1.  This has created a host of market failures, the most notable being the California 
electricity crisis. In addition, the substantial market power exercised in the England and Wales 
electricity market throughout the 1990s was the result of an attempt to introduce wholesale 
competition without these necessary features.  The initial market design failure in the England 
and Wales market was due to insufficient competition among suppliers and the market rules for 
dispatching and paying generation unit owners that were taken directly from the former 
monopoly regime, without sufficient consideration of their impact on supplier behavior in the 
wholesale market regime.  Patrick and Wolak (1997) discuss one such market rule and its impact 
on the ability of suppliers to exercise market power in the England and Wales electricity pool.   
  No country has been able to avoid market failures of some magnitude as a result of 
implementing a wholesale market without the necessary initial conditions described above. 
Therefore, it seems more realistic to expect that countries will continue to introduce wholesale 
markets with only a few, if any, of these necessary features in place.   This also seems likely for 
developing countries as well.  Consequently, the goal of this section is to describe a number of 
safeguards that countries have used to guard against adverse wholesale market outcomes. 
  Because it is impossible to characterize all possible safeguards against less-than-optimal 
initial conditions in a wholesale electricity market, I will focus on the intersection of safeguards 
that have been most commonly implemented and those most relevant to the experiences of  
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developing countries.  This discussion will describe how these safeguards have allowed the 
wholesale market to achieve tolerable outcomes while improvements in the market design along 
the five dimensions described in Section 3.1 can be implemented.  I will also point out the trade-
off built into all of these measures.  Typically, they protect consumers from harmful market 
outcomes in the short term by limiting the potential long-term benefits to consumers from a 
wholesale electricity market. 
3.2.1.  The Role of Government-Owned Market Participants 
Significant participation of government-owned entities in the wholesale market, particularly in 
the generation sector, can limit the potential for consumer harm.  As discussed in Section 2, the 
incentive for managers of these firms to maximize profits is significantly more muted than that 
facing the managers of privately owned firms.  
  One explanation for the lack of a significant market failure in the Nordic market is the 
dominant market position of two government-owned companies—Statkraft in Norway and 
Vattenfall in Sweden.  In Australia, all of the New South Wales generation units are owned by 
the state.  The Snowy Mountains hydro project on the border of New South Wales and Victoria 
is jointly owned and operated by these two states.  Substantial government participation in the 
market provides more avenues for the regulator and political process to intervene in the market 
and limit the damage to consumers caused by market design flaws.  For example, the political 
process can impose restrictions on the behavior of government-owned entities that it is unable to 
impose on privately owned companies.  
  Clearly, there is a downside to this safeguard.  The experience of Norway is instructive 
on this issue.  Wolak (1999) discusses an instance early in the Nordic market when Statkraft 
announced that wholesale electricity prices were too low and that it would not release any water 
until prices rose, which they subsequently did.   However, the opposite circumstance could have 
occurred if Statkraft felt political pressure to reduce electricity prices.  This would cause 
Statkraft to release water to drive prices down.  Privately owned potential entrants to the Nordic 
market recognize this dominant position of Statkraft and its implications for the profitability of 
fossil-fuel-based entry.  As a result, there have been no significant new generation capacity 
investments in Norway since the wholesale market was started in the early 1990s.  The chilling 
impact on private investment in new generation capacity in markets dominated by the state- 
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owned firms is particularly relevant in hydro-dominated systems where the variable cost of 
producing electricity is zero for most hours, so the only cost of selling water as electricity is the 
foregone profit from selling it in another hour.   
Although significant government participation in the generation sector may protect 
consumers from substantial harm, it has a cost in terms of long-term market efficiency. For the 
reasons discussed in Section 2, I would not expect government-owned suppliers to produce their 
output in a minimum-cost manner or undertake the new investments necessary to meet demand 
growth in a minimum-cost manner.  The evidence from the developed country reforms is that 
fossil-fuel based markets with few, if any, government-owned firms have experienced the largest 
amount of private investment in new generating facilities.   In a particularly pronounced 
example, in the England and Wales market,  a substantial increase in new combined cycle gas 
turbine capacity has driven wholesale prices so low that many generation unit owners claim to be 
on the brink of filing for bankruptcy protection.  The US has seen a similar pattern.  A substantial 
amount of new investment in generation capacity occurred in the parts of the US with formal 
wholesale markets.  Even the California market has had significant new capacity investments, 
with roughly a 10 percent increase in generation capacity on line over the past two years.  
  The combination of new investments and slower growth in demand because of a 
slowdown in the US economy has led to very low wholesale electricity prices throughout the US, 
which has adversely impacted the financial health of US wholesale electricity suppliers. In 
contrast, Victoria and New South Wales, the most populous states in Australia, have seen no new 
investment, except in peak period generation facilities, despite starting the decade of the 1990s 
with close to the same reserve margin as England and Wales. 
  Consequently, one strategy for reform is to allow state ownership initially and then sell 
off assets as many of the kinks are worked out in the initial market design.  Implementing market 
rule changes in a market dominated by state-owned entities tends to be much easier, because 
most market rule changes reallocate revenues across firms.  If most of the revenues go to 
government-owned firms, the distributional issues associated with implementing market rule 
changes should be less contentious.   If a country decides to take this path, it is important to 
recognize the difficulty in selling off government-owned assets once the politicians and 
regulators realize that intervention in the market will be more difficult and less effective with  
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less government-owned firms.  Consequently, this short-term safeguard could easily turn into a 
permanent barrier to competition in the long-term. 
  This path may be particularly problematic for LACs interested in forming a wholesale 
market to attract private investment.  The combination of a generation fleet dominated by 
hydroelectric capacity and a dominant ownership position by the government may be 
counterproductive to the goal of the reform process.  It is reasonable to expect private ESI 
investors in LACs to have the same fears about the behavior of the government-owned 
hydroelectric capacity as potential investors in the Norwegian market.  My recommended market 
design for LACs will provide suggestions for addressing the conflicting goals of protecting 
consumers and encouraging private investment in new capacity. 
3.2.2.  Cost-Based Dispatch and Local Market Power Mitigation 
A number of markets with transmission networks poorly suited for wholesale competition have 
addressed this problem by implementing cost-based local market power mitigation mechanisms 
or simply cost-based dispatch schemes. The local market power mitigation mechanisms usually 
give the ISO the discretion to determine, depending on current system conditions, whether a 
supplier possesses substantial local market power. Under those circumstances, the bids of units 
deemed to possess local market power are mitigated to their variable cost, or variable cost plus 
an adder, and these mitigated bids are then entered into the ISO’s price-setting process.  In a 
market with cost-based dispatch, suppliers are required to file their start-up, no-load and variable 
costs with the regulator.  Once these costs are approved by the regulator, suppliers are required to 
bid these costs into the market, and they are paid market-clearing prices based on these cost-
based bids. 
  The logic behind these mitigation mechanisms follows from the discussion of impact of 
transmission network expansion on the elasticity of the residual demand curve facing a supplier 
from Section 3.1.4.  Specifically, the ISO must judge whether there exists sufficient competition 
among suppliers on either side of a congested interface to allow market forces to set the price on 
both sides of the interface.  Viewed from this perspective, transmission constraints shrink the 
number of suppliers that compete to serve demand at each location in the network.  Almost by 
definition, a higher incidence of transmission congestion cannot lead to more competitive 
bidding by suppliers.  
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  To understand how a commonly used local market power mitigation mechanism works, 
consider the example in Section 3.1.4 with 9,000 MW of transmission capacity into the demand 
center with 9,500 MWh of local demand and 1,000 MW of local generation.  Under these 
circumstances, the local supplier is pivotal for 500 MWh of energy.  Allowing this local 
monopolist to set the market price will cause it to submit an extremely high bid.  If there is no 
price cap in this market, there is no limit on the price this supplier could bid and be called on to 
supply the needed 500 MWh.   Even though there was a price cap in the California electricity 
market, something like this occurred because FERC required the California ISO to pay all units 
without Reliability Must Run (RMR) contracts that possessed local market power their bid price 
instead of providing the ISO with effective local market power mitigation, as it did for the 
eastern US ISOs.
2   Apparently, FERC did not recognize that local market power problems are 
endemic to all electricity markets with insufficient transmission capacity to support a competitive 
wholesale market at all locations in the network, regardless of the mechanism used to manage 
transmission congestion.  As discussed earlier, a strong case can be made that all transmission 
networks in the US are insufficient to support a competitive wholesale market without effective 
local market power mitigation. 
  Although the California market is not unique in having a transmission network that is 
poorly suited to a wholesale electricity market, it is unique in being required to pay generation 
units (without RMR contracts) that possess substantial local market power their bid price to 
supply energy.   In the PJM, New York and New England electricity markets, FERC allows the 
ISO to implement mitigation mechanisms that limit the potential harm to consumers from local 
market power.  Under the scheme in PJM, the ISO implements a two-step process for local 
market power mitigation.  It starts with the ISO operator’s best estimate of system conditions for 
the following day, including the level of demand at each location in the network and the mix of 
available generation units in the control area, and implements a well-defined process for 
determining whether a unit possesses significant local market power.  If this unit-level 
determination is affirmative, then the bids of this unit are mitigated to their variable cost plus a 
 
2 Reliability Must Run (RMR) contracts were contracts between the certain suppliers and the California ISO that 
allowed the ISO operators to call upon the unit to provide local reliability energy at a contractually determined price.  
Bushnell and Wolak (1999) discuss these contracts and a flaw in their initial design.  
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10 percent adder.  Then the ISOs dispatch and price-setting algorithm is implemented with these 
cost-based bids in place of the unit’s actual bids.  All units are then paid the resulting market-
clearing price.  The other eastern US ISOs have different local market power mitigation 
measures, but none of them involve paying generation unit owners their bid price when they 
have local market power. Wolak (2002) discusses the PJM local market power mitigation 
mechanism in detail. 
  As an additional safeguard against local market  power problems and system-wide market 
power problems during the first year of operation of the PJM market, all suppliers were required 
to submit regulated start-up, no load, and variable costs into the ISO’s dispatch and price-setting 
algorithm.   Generators were then paid the market-clearing price based on these cost-based bids.  
The ability of the ISO to dispatch and set prices using cost-based bids or mitigate to variable cost 
the bids of all units that it deems possess substantial local market power, prevents the wholesale 
market from causing significant harm to consumers.  
  It is important to emphasize that this safeguard is not without short-term inefficiencies 
and long-term costs.  Because of the individual rationality constraint on firm behavior, one 
response to this mechanism by profit-maximizing firms owning a portfolio of generation units is 
to withhold the less expensive units in their portfolio from the market, either through planned or 
forced outages, so that higher-cost units will be called on to run more frequently and therefore 
set higher market-clearing prices earned by all of the units supplying energy in the firm’s 
portfolio.  A longer-term response from firms would be to reconfigure their generation units and 
how they operate them to shift costs from fixed costs to start-up, no load or variable costs in 
order to justify a higher cost-based bid, and set higher market prices.  The problem of variable 
cost creep could be quite severe if the California crisis is at all representative of firm behavior. 
  Kolstad and Wolak (2003) find evidence that, during the summer of 2000, suppliers with 
some plants located inside the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) and 
others outside of the area used NOx emissions permit prices from the SCAQMD emission permit 
market to justify higher bids into the California ISO’s real-time energy market from generation 
units with high NOx emissions rates.   This strategy was very successful at raising prices in the 
CAISO’s real-time energy market during the summer of 2000.  We discuss specific problems 
with cost-based dispatch real-time markets that are specific to LACs later in the paper.  
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3.2.3.  The ISO as a Market Operator versus a Market Participant 
The ownership and mode of operation of the ISO provides another method for the market 
designer to implement regulatory safeguards.   The most common model for an ISO in the US is 
as a non-profit public-benefit corporation.  In most other countries, it is a government-owned 
corporate entity.  Finally, in other markets it is a privately-owned regulated monopoly.  ISOs also 
differ in terms of whether the regulator allows them to take a financial position in the market.  
The US takes the extreme view that the ISO is simply a neutral market and system operator.  In 
England and Wales, National Grid operates the system in real-time and the regulator allows it to 
take a financial position in the market.  In fact, the regulatory mechanism that sets National 
Grid’s allowed revenues gives it strong incentives to reduce the real-time costs of operating the 
system. 
  The goal of forming the ISO as a non-profit or government-owned entity is to ensure that 
it will operate the grid in a non-discriminatory manner.  However, if as is the case in all US 
markets and a number of countries around the world, retailers are subject to restrictions on their 
strategies for procuring energy and ancillary services to meet their load obligations by state 
public utilities commissions (PUCs) and/or national regulators, and suppliers do not face these 
same constraints, then retailers may not be able to take all of the actions necessary to protect 
themselves from high wholesale prices.  In the US, many retailers complain that they are 
prohibited or limited by PUCs in the sorts of activities they can engage in relative to wholesale 
electricity suppliers.  This is an artifact of suppliers being primarily regulated by FERC and 
retailers being primarily regulated by state PUCs. 
  This asymmetry between suppliers and retailers can create circumstances when an ISO 
that does not take a position in the market is forced to accept extremely high bids for small 
amounts of additional energy in the real-time market on a consistent basis.  Even if the ISO 
believes that it can meet predictable incremental energy needs in real-time at a lower cost by 
purchasing more energy in the forward market than in the spot market, it is prohibited from 
doing so.  Under the US approach, ISOs are only supposed to execute feasible trades among 
market participants. 
  National Grid Company (NGC) provides an alternative solution to this problem.   It is a 
market participant charged with ensuring reliable transmission network operation in real-time.   
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Consequently, if NGC is able to find a cheaper way to procure the necessary real-time energy 
and ancillary services in the forward market, then the England and Wales regulator allows it to 
do so.  The amount of revenues NGC is allowed to earn is based on how well it manages these 
real-time system operation costs.  For this reason, NGC rarely accepts bids with very high energy 
prices, because it has the freedom to take a position in the forward market to protect against these 
high bid prices. 
  The upside of this model for the ISO is that it creates another sophisticated buyer of 
energy and ancillary services with the ability to take actions to reduce electricity prices.  The 
downside is that over the long-term, retailers have less incentive to become sophisticated market 
participants, so that fewer load-serving entities and consumers make the investments required to 
become sophisticated players.  The final downside is that unless the regulator is able to control 
what actions or financial positions in the market the ISO is able to take, adverse market 
outcomes beneficial to the ISO but harmful to producers and consumers could occur.  The NGC 
ISO model requires a far more sophisticated and credible regulator than an independent market 
operator model, because the privately owned, profit-maximizing ISO is an essential feature of 
this scheme. 
  An interesting variation on this theme is a government-owned ISO is charged with 
operating the transmission network to facilitate a competitive wholesale market.  This 
organizational form creates an ISO with more discretion to take positions in the wholesale 
market.  However, given its ownership structure the ISO is less likely to engage in privately 
profitable actions that may cause consumer harm.  This model for an ISO may result in a better 
balance between providing protection for consumers and reliable non-discriminatory access to 
the transmission network in LACs. 
 
4.  Challenges to Implementing a Competitive Wholesale Market Unique to 
LACs 
 
This section describes seven challenges unique to LACs that are associated with implementing a 
competitive wholesale electricity market.  The first is how to guarantee adequate energy to meet 
demand in a country where hydroelectric capacity is a significant portion of the country’s 
generation mix.  The second concerns the difficulty of establishing a forward market for  
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electricity where privately owned suppliers can purchase long-term commitments to supply 
electricity that they can use to fund investment in new generating facilities.  The third concerns 
the difficulty of establishing an independent regulator or regulatory body that has the legal 
authority and can accumulate the expertise necessary to be a credible and effective regulator.  
The fourth issue is the costs versus benefits of bid-based versus cost-based real-time dispatch of 
generation units and pricing of electricity and ancillary services.  The fifth challenge is how to 
set the allowed revenues that regulated retailers can earn.   The sixth challenge is appropriate 
mechanism to guarantee that adequate generation capacity is constructed to meet a rapidly 
growing demand for electricity.  The final issue is the necessity of private ownership in the four 
segments of the industry—generation, transmission, distribution and retailing. 
 
4.1. The Gambling with the Weather Problem and the Cost-of-Deficit Parameter 
 
There are a number of potential pitfalls in attempting to establish a competitive wholesale market 
in a hydro-dominated system.  The first is what I would like to refer to as the “gambling with the 
weather problem.”  The second is the problem of encouraging fuel diversity.  The third relates to 
the problem of attracting new investment when much of the hydro capacity is owned by the 
government.  A final issue—how to involve final demand in the wholesale market—is a source 
of potential benefits that should be easy for the market designer to exploit. 
  Because the only cost of producing electricity from a hydroelectric source is the 
opportunity cost of producing that energy during some other hour of the year, this creates 
opportunities for the market operator to take actions to impact this opportunity cost.  Given the 
desire of politicians and regulators to keep the price of wholesale electricity as low as possible, 
the following strategy for dispatching generation in facilities is particularly tempting for the ISO 
to adopt in a hydro-dominated ESI. 
  A number of the hydro-based systems in Latin American use a stochastic dynamic 
programming approach to determine the opportunity cost of water each day.   For example, in 
Chile the system operator uses a simplified stochastic dynamic programming model that uses as 
inputs forecasts of the water level of the largest hydro facility in the country, the regulated costs 
of fossil fuel facilities, and a number of other factors to arrive at an opportunity cost of water.  
Brazil uses a similar but more complex procedure because of its substantially larger control area  
51 
 
and number of river basins to manage.  An important input to all of these models is the cost-of-
deficit parameter.  This is the dollar per MWh cost of having insufficient water to meet the 
demand for electricity at the prevailing retail price.  This cost-of-deficit parameter should be 
related to the price at which all consumers are willing to reduce their consumption.  However, 
because the default retail price in most LACs is set independent of system conditions, the cost-
of- deficit parameter is typically set by the regulator. 
  However, because of a desire to keep the price of wholesale power as low as possible, the 
regulator and government have difficulty in not setting this cost-of-deficit unrealistically low.  
For example, in Brazil the current value of the cost-of-deficit parameter is 350 Real/MWH, 
which is approximately $100/MWh.  Corresponding values of this parameter from developed 
countries are over $1,000/MWh.   For example, all of the eastern ISOs in the US have bid caps 
on their wholesale market of $1,000/MWh, which can produce location prices above this level. 
  Figure 4 illustrates why LAC governments find it so tempting to set the cost-of-deficit 
parameter so low and why this leads to what appear to be energy shortages.  For simplicity I 
consider only a single demand scenario and two possible supply scenarios—a low water year that 
occurs very infrequently and a high water year that occurs more frequently.  Let PAverage equal the 
wholesale price implicit in the fixed retail price of electricity.  This price is set to recover the 
total costs of suppliers in both high and low water years.  During high water years, fossil fuel 
facilities can be run less intensively, to the width of the bar labeled “Fossil Generation in High 
HydroYear,” which is narrower than the box labeled “Fossil Generation in Low Hydro Year.”  
The height of each of these boxes is the average total cost of supplying fossil fuel-based energy 
equal to the width of this box.  The box labeled “Low Hydro Year” has a width equal to the 
production of hydro units in a low water year and height equal to the average total cost of 
producing this energy—the fixed costs of the hydro facilities divided by the output quantity.  The 
box labeled “High Hydro Year” has width equal to the production of hydro units in a high water 
year and height equal to the average cost of supplying this energy.  The reason the dashed line 
for the “Low Hydro Year” box is higher than the solid line for the “High Hydro Year” box is 
because the same fixed cost is relevant for both years, but more energy is produced from the 
hydro facilities in the high hydro year.  
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  For simplicity we assume the demand for electricity is the same in high and low water 
years because the retail price is the same in high and low water years.  This creates an apparent 
shortage condition in low hydro years that is driven purely by the fact that the price of electricity 
is not allowed to rise to the level necessary to equate available supply with demand during the 
very infrequently occurring low hydro years.  Note that in both the high hydro years and low 
hydro years, the products PAverage*QLow and  PAverage*QHigh both cover the total costs of producing 
hydro and fossil-fuel based electricity.  Consequently, the government covers the total costs of 
supplying electricity under both hydro conditions at PAverage.  However, because the cost-of-
deficit is set too low, the average wholesale price is too low to prevent shortage periods during 
low hydro years.  When low hydro years occur there is a shortage of electricity at PAverage equal 
to QHigh -  QLow.   
  This example shows that if the government or regulator is willing to gamble with the 
weather in the sense of setting a low cost-of-deficit parameter and betting on high hydro 
realizations, the government can achieve the very important political goal of low wholesale 
electricity prices and still maintain the financial health of the electricity supply industry.   
However, the downside of this unrealistically low cost-of-deficit parameter is that when low 
hydro conditions occur there will be a shortage of electricity at the prevailing fixed retail price. 
  The example also demonstrates an obvious but often ignored logical implication of using 
stochastic dynamic programming models to set the opportunity cost of water.  If the cost-of-
deficit parameter is set at a level that assumes shortages of water are not very costly, then periods 
of water shortages will occur.  If the cost-of-deficit parameter is set at a level that assumes 
shortages of water are extremely costly, then periods of water shortages will rarely occur.   
However, an important corollary to these statements is that the price of electricity will, on 
average, be higher with a higher cost-of-deficit parameter.  
  Given the enormous economic and political costs associated with periods of shortages at 
the prevailing retail price, the obvious solution to this problem is to use a cost-of-deficit 
parameter in the stochastic dynamic programming model that reflects these enormous costs.   
This will ensure that wholesale prices rise during low hydro years and, if a significant number of 
consumers pay a retail price linked to the current wholesale price, these higher prices will  
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allocate this lower supply of electricity to those who value it most and eliminate the apparent 
shortage of electricity. 
  Ideally, the cost-of-deficit parameter should be set equal to the highest willingness to pay 
for electricity among all consumers. Then, as the amount of available water declines and 
wholesale prices rise, consumers can choose not to purchase electricity.   Under this scheme, any 
set of hydro conditions can be managed without having to resort to arbitrary curtailments of 
electricity supply to customers willing to pay for the scarcity value of this electricity. 
  Setting the cost-of-deficit parameter too low also has important implications for 
encouraging fuel diversity.   Note that PAverage is always below the average cost of producing 
fossil-fuel-based electricity.  This means that unless the government pays a subsidy to the fossil-
fuel-based entrants they cannot make enough money from selling in the wholesale market to 
justify their investment.   Therefore, setting a realistic cost-of-deficit parameter is a necessary 
first step towards encouraging fuel diversity in hydroelectric-dominated LACs. 
  The fact that the hydroelectric capacity is government-owned exacerbates the problem of 
a new entrant earning sufficient revenues to justify his investment.  Prospective new entrants are 
discouraged by the realization that the government does not want to raise the wholesale price 
during low hydro years, but is instead willing to declare a shortage period instead raising 
wholesale price if these hydro conditions arise.  If the wholesale electricity price was allowed to 
allocate the available supply of electricity during low hydro years, the new entrant could recover 
his total costs plus an additional return to allow him to remain in the market during high hydro 
years when the average wholesale price is below the average total cost of a new fossil facility. 
  All of these problems with hydro-dominated systems underscore the importance of 
sending real-time price signals to final consumers.  Different from the case of fossil fuel-based 
systems, in systems dominated by hydro production, demand response is often the only way to 
manage the system reliably.  For fossil fuel-based systems, the regulator counts on higher prices 
to cause a supply response.  Generation unit owners will run their machines more intensively or 
purchase more expensive input fuel on the spot market if electricity prices increase, either of 
which can eliminate a supply and demand imbalance.  Unfortunately, as noted earlier, rainfall 
does not increase in response to higher prices in a hydro-dominated system.  The only way to  
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manage a supply and demand imbalance in this case is to send price signals to final consumers to 
reduce their consumption of energy. 
  Because price volatility in a hydro-dominated system tends to be seasonal, rather than 
hourly or weekly, there is little need for hourly meters in order to treat load and generation 
symmetrically in a hydro-dominated system.  Retail prices could be adjusted prospectively on a 
monthly basis and existing metering technology could be used to implement retail prices that are 
responsive to real-time market conditions in the wholesale market—whether is it is a high or low 
hydro year. 
  The more an ESI is dominated by hydroelectric capacity, the more likely it is that system 
conditions will arise that cannot be managed without sending wholesale price signals to final 
consumers.  The more an ESI is dominated by hydroelectric capacity, the more straightforward it 
is to send meaningful price signals to retail customers without additional retail infrastructure 
investments, because it is more likely that the spot price risk that must be managed is seasonal, 
so that existing monthly or even quarterly metering reading is sufficient to charge consumers 
prices that vary with wholesale market conditions.   Each month or season, retailers can set an 
average wholesale rate implicit in the retail rate that reflects the best estimate of system 
conditions for the coming month or season.  Setting retail prices in this manner will prevent 
eventual energy shortages because final customers will have a strong incentive to reduce their 
demand in response to current supply conditions. 
 
4.2.  Fostering a Forward Market for Electricity 
 
As is emphasized in Section 3, spot electricity markets are extremely susceptible to the unilateral 
exercise of market power.  The most effective way to limit the ability of suppliers to exercise 
market power in a spot market is to limit the amount of their production that is sold in this 
market. This is accomplished by providing strong incentives for suppliers to sign forward 
contracts with load-serving entities.  There are two ways to cause existing suppliers to sign 
forward contracts: (1) make the forward market very attractive by setting high prices, or (2) drive 
down the expected spot market price because that is the relevant opportunity cost to suppliers 
that sign forward contracts.  For new suppliers this second avenue is not available.  If the spot 
market is unattractive they are less likely to build new capacity.  
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  Consequently, the challenge to LACs is how to develop a forward market that will 
support the construction of new capacity. LACs also have the additional problem that 
negotiations between load-serving entities and electricity producers may result in these two 
parties coordinating to raise the purchase price of the contract at the expense of final consumers.  
For example, in Brazil many of the retailers have affiliates that also own generation units, so 
there is a strong incentive for the retailer to purchase energy from its generation affiliate at an 
inflated price that is passed on to the retailer’s customers. 
  One way to deal with this problem is to set up periodic anonymous auctions for 
standardized load shapes for delivery at specific locations in the transmission network.  For 
example, one auction could be for supplying 1 MWh, twenty-four hours a day for five years, at a 
pre-specified location in the network, starting next year.  All suppliers would submit their bid 
price and quantity for supplying this standardized load shape.  The regulator would then 
determine the market-clearing price and how much each supplier won.  These standardized 
contracts could then be traded on the secondary market and used to finance new investments in 
generation capacity. 
  The advantage of these periodic formal auctions of standardized contracts is that they 
would produce prices that could be used to set reference levels for the wholesale price 
component of retail electricity prices.  In addition, because most LACs are dominated by hydro 
capacity, the primary source of price variation is across seasons, so there may be less need for a 
large number of standardized contracts.  The only important difference in electricity prices may 
be across locations as a result of congestion, but not over time at that location, because the 
opportunity cost of water implies equalizing electricity prices at the same location over time. 
  Although the requirement to sell only standardized contracts may raise the cost of 
supplying forward contracts for electricity, the increased competitive pressures firms face, 
because these contracts are sold in an anonymous auction according to well-defined market rules 
open to all suppliers, should make the auction sufficiently competitive that bidders have very 






4.3.  Establishing an Independent Regulator 
 
Establishing a credible and effective regulatory process is an ongoing process.  The US has been 
involved in this process for almost 100 years at the state and federal level for electricity, 
telecommunications and natural gas, and significant mistakes are still being made.  Regulation is 
necessarily imperfect, for the simple reason that the regulator can never know as much as the 
firm does about its production process, demand or service territory, and these factors are 
continually changing. 
  Regulation also requires turning vague statements such as “just and reasonable prices” 
into operational concepts.  Over the past 70 years there have been a number of legal disputes in 
the United States that have further refined this concept, but the process is far from over.  It is 
important to recognize the need for continuous change in any regulatory process.   
  An important lesson from the transition to a competitive wholesale market regime in the 
United States is that the regulatory mechanisms that worked in the former vertically integrated 
monopoly regime are inappropriate for the new competitive wholesale market regime.   In the 
former regime, the process of setting just and reasonable prices focused on collecting and 
analyzing balance sheet information from market participants according to well-defined 
accounting techniques.  Consequently, the rate-setting process involved primarily lawyers 
managing the process and accountants implementing procedures to compute prices.  In the 
competitive market regime, the US process is concerned with setting just and reasonable market 
rules, mechanisms for compensating market participants that will result in just and reasonable 
market outcomes.  This means that if firms respect their individual rationality constraints, market 
outcomes will yield prices that do not harm consumers yet still recover the production costs of all 
suppliers.   This is a process that requires a substantially more sophisticated regulator, because it 
must be able to anticipate the likely response of market participants to any market rule changes 
or any regulatory intervention it might undertake.  This is an extremely difficult task, but one 
way to make it easier is to enlist the help of the public. 
  The regulator can best enlist the help of the public in obtaining just and reasonable 
market outcomes by recognizing that the primary role of regulation is information provision.  
Perhaps the most cost-effective form of regulation in a market environment is sunshine 
regulation—shining the light of public scrutiny on the behavior of certain market participants or  
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the individual profitability or cost to system reliability and market efficiency of certain market 
participant actions.  This regulatory strategy underscores the importance of disseminating the 
raw data on market outcomes and market participant behavior to the public as well as the need to 
establish a set of standardized measures of market performance that are disseminated on a 
regular basis. 
  There is a natural dividing point between data that should be made available to the public 
and data that should remain confidential.  Specifically, any information submitted to the spot 
market and system operator or produced by these entities should be made available to the public.  
Information on supplier and generation unit-specific bids to the day-ahead and real-time energy 
markets should be made available, as should data on the actual output of each generation units by 
owner and withdrawals of electricity at each location in the transmission network.  Information 
on the amount of transmission capacity available on day-ahead scheduled and real-time basis and 
the scheduled and real-time energy flows along the various transmission paths should also be 
made available.  Finally, if the market is dispatched on the basis of cost-based bids, these bids 
should be disclosed to the public. The logic underlying this information disclosure requirement is 
that day-ahead and real-time market operation should be transparent as possible to all market 
participants.  Any market participant should be able to replicate the actual day-ahead and spot 
market outcomes down to the specific generation unit and take-out point for load-serving 
entities.   
This information should be released to the public with the minimum possible time lag 
with supplier-specific identifiers for each market participant.  There are a number of reasons why 
data release should be immediate.  The first is that it will be very difficult for market participants 
to make the best use of this information if it not immediately available to them.  Although there 
may be concerns that releasing this information with a short time lag may help suppliers to 
coordinate their actions to raise market prices, this concern is much less relevant if the day-ahead 
and real-time markets are operated using cost-based bids.  If the market is bid-based, this may be 
a reason to delay data release up to one month from the actual date of the market outcomes.  
Immediate data release helps solve another problem in developing countries—establishing 
credibility of the regulatory process.  If the regulator is able to make its case in the court of 
public opinion using data that is available to all interested parties, it is less likely to be influenced  
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by the political process, because any claim it might make can be verified by interested parties.  A 
pre-commitment to immediate data release also provides strong incentives for market 
participants to treat the day-ahead and real-time energy markets as balancing markets, rather than 
markets where any sizeable amount of net energy is bought or sold.  In this way it provides an 
additional incentive for the establishment of an active forward market for energy.  Moreover, to 
the extent that the operation of short-term energy markets that forward contracts clear against are 
better understood by all market participants, the smaller will be the risk premium that each side 
of demands to sign a financial arrangement for delivery of electricity at some date in the future. 
If a supplier or load-serving entity is unable to forecast spot market outcomes accurately, they 
will demand a risk premium to engage in forward contracts to compensate them for this risk.  
Consequently, it is in the interest of all parties involved for these short-term markets to be as 
transparent as possible.  Another important reason for immediate data public data release is that 
it reduces the barriers to new entry.  If the short-term energy markets are well-understood and 
transparent to a large number of potential and actual market participants, this will reduce the cost 
to a prospective new entrant to gathering the necessary data to perform a feasibility study for 
determine whether and where to enter the industry.  In addition, if there are standardized 
measures of market performance computed on a regular basis available to the public, this should 
further reduce the barriers to new entry, which will further increase the competitiveness of the 
energy and capacity markets.  A final reason for immediate public data release is that it should 
improve the process of determining the feasibility of transmission upgrades.  One could imagine 
the ISO computing and dissemination on the causes and costs of congestion on each transmission 
path as a mechanism for encouraging market participants and regulators to determine whether a 
local demand needs is served at least cost by a transmission upgrade or new generation entry.  
This data release policy for the regulatory is consistent with the view that the day-ahead and real-
time markets are primarily mechanisms for ensuring system reliability and market efficiency, 
something all market participants should have a common interest in. 
The forward energy market, defined as all markets that clear more than one day in 
advance of delivery, should be a primary market where energy is purchased and sold.   
Information on these transactions should remain confidential.  There is no system reliability or 
spot market efficiency rationale for requiring this information to be publicly disclosed.    
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Specifically, the system or spot market operator does not need to know these forward market 
positions in order to reliably and efficiently operate the system on a day-ahead and real-time 
basis.   Therefore, market participants should be free to take financial positions in these markets 
that they are able to keep confidential.  This is not to say that under certain circumstances the 
regulator should not be able to obtain this information from market participants, only that it 
should not be required to be released to the public on a regular basis. 
There are two other reasons for this dichotomy in the regulator’s data release policy.  The 
first relates to point made in Wolak (2003c) that the bid curve of a given supplier conveys little 
information about that supplier’s variable cost of producing electricity unless the researcher 
knows the supplier’s forward market position.  Consequently, requiring a supplier to disclose 
bids or production levels should not allow current or future market participants to infer the nature 
of a supplier’s production costs or the prices it paid for input fuels.  In addition, because forward 
market positions are purely financial, it is difficult determine the true forward financial position 
of a specific market participant because it may have signed another financial contract with an 
affiliate company that completely unwinds any forward financial position it might report to its 
regulator.  For example, even if a given company is required to report all forward contract 
positions it has signed to the regulator, this company may have signed forward contracts with a 
parent or affiliate company that the regulator has no jurisdiction over.  This parent or affiliate 
company could then split off the components of this forward contract position to other entities to 
completely unwind the forward market position that was reported to the regulator by the market 
participant.  This possibility limits the usefulness of forward market information to the regulator 
in a market where many of the suppliers are a part of large, diversified companies, as is the case 
in many companies.  This makes the case for the regulator collecting forward market information 
much less compelling.  In contrast, because day-ahead and real-time market information 
determines how specific generation units will operate and how much energy load-serving entities 
will ultimately deliver to final consumers, this issue is not relevant for data from the short-term 
energy markets. 
  The final issue on the design of a regulatory oversight process is how to establish 
credibility and expertise.  Credibility is similar to reputation, and the only way to establish a 
reputation for sound decisions is to always make sound decisions.  This implies that the regulator  
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must slowly build up its reputation by making decisions that it believes can withstand judicial 
review.  If the regulator is always upheld on judicial review, this establishes a reputation that the 
regulator can exploit over time.  By starting with smaller decisions that can withstand judicial 
review, the regulator builds a reputation for substantial expertise that can be exploited to support 
some decisions in the future requiring more discretion by the regulator.  As noted above, making 
these decisions based on publicly available data is another way to establish credibility.   
  A second way to establish regulatory credibility is to perform analyses in accordance 
with international standards for market monitoring and oversight.  There is a generally 
acknowledged set of market performance indices used in most developed countries.  Competitive 
benchmark pricing analyses, as discussed in Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002), are now 
performed in all US markets and a number of international markets.  Computing the frequency 
that large suppliers are pivotal in an energy or ancillary services market is also a part of the 
market monitoring process in a number of US and international markets.  All of the market 
monitors in US produce annual summaries of market performance that share a surprising amount 
of agreement on the market performance measures reported. LAC regulators should adopt these 
similar reporting standards as a way to increase their expertise and credibility. 
  Another way to use international market monitoring standards to improve the credibility 
and expertise of the domestic regulatory body is to establish an independent market advisory 
committee.  This committee would be composed of three to four international experts on 
electricity market design, monitoring and regulation.  Consistent with the goal of sunshine 
regulation described above, the primary role of this committee would be information provision. 
It would be charged with monitoring the performance of the market and the market and system 
operator. The committee would have no formal decision-making power or ability to impose 
penalties or sanctions on specific market participants.  However, it would have the ability to 
issue opinions to the public on specific issues the regulator or system operator would like it to 
address, or that it decides to address. With the assistance of the system and market operator, it 
would also prepare periodic reports on the performance of the ESI that would be publicly 
available.  For this reason it should have access to the all market data and any confidential data 
the regulator and market operators are able to obtain.  
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  There are a variety of ways this independent committee can improve the credibility and 
effectiveness of the regulatory process.  By issuing an opinion on a contentious issue that 
provides perspective on how this issue has been resolved internationally, the independent 
committee can make it more difficult for the government and judiciary to go against a decision 
by the regulator that is consistent with precedents from other countries around the world.   
Because the committee would have the ability to issue opinions on any issue it deems worthy of 
further study, it would have the ability to point out market design flaws the regulator may have 
missed either on purpose or because of political pressure to ignore them.  This committee would 
be expected to meet approximately every other month but be available for telephone 
consultations with the regulator and its staff on a more regular basis.  These interactions among 
participants will increase the transfer of international expertise in market monitoring and 
regulation to the domestic regulator.  Because this committee has no legal power besides the 
ability to issue opinions and demand and receive information that it analyzes to formulate these 
opinions, it can be a very effective neutral forum for resolving many controversial issues 
between the stakeholders.  Given the difficulty that virtually all LACs have had in establishing a 
credible regulatory mechanism, the potential benefits of forming such a committee, at least for 
the first five years following the reform, appear to outweigh the costs for most all LACs. 
 
4.4.  Bid-Based versus Cost-Based Dispatch and Pricing 
 
One lesson from ESI reform in LACs that has not received much notice from developed 
countries is the use of cost-based dispatch and pricing in short-term energy and reserve markets. 
With the exception of the single transitional year in PJM in 1998 discussed earlier, no developed 
countries have implemented cost-based dispatch or pricing schemes.  All of these markets allow 
generation unit owners to submit bids in the form of either simple supply curves that give each 
unit’s willingness to supply energy as a function of the market price or multi-part bids, usually 
with a start-up bid, no-load bid and a willingness to supply curve bid as a function of the market 
price.  As noted previously, bid-based dispatch and pricing has two obvious disadvantages, 
particularly in markets with insufficient transmission capacity to face all suppliers with enough 
competition at all locations in the network.  The first is system-wide market power, which is the 
ability to raise the system-wide price by bidding a willingness to supply curve that exceeds a  
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unit’s marginal cost curve at the level of output from the unit that the firm expects to sell in the 
market.  The second problem is local market power, which occurs when a unit or set of units 
faces an extremely inelastic residual demand curve (usually perfectly inelastic) because of 
transmission constraints into a geographic area.  Under both of these circumstances, prices in a 
bid-based market can be expected to be substantially in excess of the marginal cost of the highest 
cost unit operating in the market for the case of system-wide market power, and in a smaller 
geographic area for the case of local market power. 
  Starting with Chile, virtually all LACs, with the exception of Colombia, dispatch and set 
prices using regulated unit-level costs as opposed to bids.  This is an important safeguard that 
allows a country to avoid the enormous expense of setting up a bid-based dispatch and pricing 
process.  The cost-based approach also allows the ISO to avoid the time and expense of 
formulating a local market power mitigation mechanism, which is essential in an ESI that does 
not have a transmission network that can support a competitive wholesale market, as is the case 
in all LACs.  The quality of the transmission network in most LACs provides another argument 
in favor of a cost-based dispatch and pricing mechanism. 
  One argument in favor of the bid-based system is that it allows hydroelectric unit owners 
to manage their water more efficiently.  They can bid their willingness to supply electricity, or 
equivalently water, and raise the price of electricity when they believe scarcity conditions are 
more likely.  These higher prices will reduce the likelihood of electricity shortages because fossil 
fuel units will be run more intensively, much earlier in a low hydro year.  However, unless final 
consumers actually pay these higher prices they will continue to consume at the levels they 
would in any other year with the same weather conditions and fixed retail price.  This will cause 
a so-called “shortage period” that is not a shortage of energy to meet the demand at any finite 
price, but an unwillingness to let the retail price rise to the level necessary to allocate the 
available water. 
  Returning to our example in Figure 5, the most likely outcome in a bid-based market 
during a low water year is that the wholesale prices rise because hydroelectric capacity owners 
bid higher prices to conserve their water.  However, if the retail price is maintained at PAverage, 
there is still a shortage of energy, because retail demand stays at QHigh and there is not enough 
water to meet this demand.   Because hydroelectric suppliers bidding higher prices will cause  
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fossil fuel generation units to operate more frequently than they would with lower wholesale 
prices, the amount of energy available in a low hydro year should be greater than it would be if 
the wholesale price were not allowed to rise.  However, if there is still a shortfall of energy 
relative to the demand at PAverage with these fossil fuel units operating more intensively, the retail 
price must be increased above this level or rationing will still be necessary.  There is no way to 
avoid the basic reality that demand must be the marginal supplier of additional negawatts of 
electricity during extremely low water conditions, regardless of the decision to use a bid-based or 
cost-based spot market. 
  There is also a more straightforward way to ensure that the fossil fuel units are used as 
efficiently as possible during low water conditions.   Raise the cost-of-deficit parameter to a level 
that is at least equal to the highest individual willingness to pay for electricity of all consumers in 
the system.  This cost-of-deficit parameter will cause fossil fuel facilities to be operated more 
intensively sufficiently far in advance to provide at least as good of a hedge against water 
shortages as allowing hydroelectric suppliers to bid their willingness to supply energy.   
However, this scheme does not have either the system-wide or local market power risk of 
suppliers creating an artificial scarcity to raise the price of electricity. 
  Consequently, particularly for hydro-dependent systems, shortages must ultimately be 
managed by allowing loads to be the marginal supplier of negawatts, meaning that the 
willingness of consumers facing retail prices that vary with real-time system conditions to reduce 
their purchases is the only way to solve the demand and supply imbalance during certain system 
conditions.  Because higher prices do not cause more rainfall, there is a sufficiently low water 
level where demand reduction is the only way to maintain system balance.   Increasing the retail 
prices consumers pay during these circumstances is the only way to make consumers more 
willing to supply the necessary negawatts. 
  Cost-based markets have an additional advantage that reinforces the goal of fostering 
active forward markets for energy.  In particular, assuming that the regulator follows the data 
release policies given above, suppliers will have a much easier time forecasting spot electricity 
prices in a cost-based market versus a bid-based market, because they will not have forecast the 
ability of suppliers to exercise market power through their bids into the spot market.  Although it 
is extremely difficult to forecast the ability of suppliers to exercise market power by bidding into  
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the spot market, as the California and New Zealand markets vividly demonstrate, the ability of 
suppliers to exercise unilateral market power is a major determinant of the mean and variance of 
prices in short-term electricity markets.  A cost-based market eliminates the variation in spot 
electricity prices that occurs from suppliers bidding to raise or lower these prices.  This should 
reduce the cost of suppliers and load-serving entities signing forward contracts, because both 
sides will have less uncertainty about the time path of spot prices over the duration of the 
contract.  Both parties can compute forecasts of future spot prices using the publicly available 
market outcomes data along with the cost-based dispatch algorithm. 
  Although suppliers are constrained to bid their regulated costs in a cost-based market, this 
does not eliminate the incentive or ability of privately owned suppliers to exercise market power.  
Consistent with the discussion of Section 2, these attempts to exercise market power simply take 
a different form.  Specifically, suppliers can now be expected to attempt to raise their regulated 
costs of production that enter the dispatch process. Consequently, a necessary pre-condition for a 
cost-based market is that the regulator must have in place a mechanism for determining whether 
the production costs a supplier reports have been prudently incurred.  As noted in Wolak (2003b) 
with respect to the soft price cap implemented by the FERC in the California market in 
December 2000, a cost-justification process that does not impose a prudency review on how 
costs are incurred effectively provides no protection against the exercise of unilateral market 
power, because suppliers can make fuel costs and other input costs equal whatever level they 
would like bid through transactions with affiliate companies, so that a cost-based market 
becomes equivalent to a bid-based market. 
The experience of California with the soft price is instructive in this regard.  Many of the 
electricity suppliers in the California market had natural gas supply affiliates.  The FERC soft 
cap policy allowed a supplier that could cost-justify its bid above $150/MWh to be paid as bid 
for their energy.  The March 2003 FERC staff report on western US energy markets found 
substantial evidence that suppliers inflated the natural gas prices reported to FERC as 
justification for bids above the $150/MWh soft price cap.
3  The solution to the problem of 
 
3 “Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets:  Fact Finding Investigation of Potential Manipulation of 
Electric and Natural Gas Prices,” Docket No. PA02-2-000, March 2003, Prepared by Staff of Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission.  
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inflated input fuel prices recommended by the FERC staff is to use the spot natural gas price at 
Henry Hub, a very liquid spot market for natural gas in Louisiana, plus the FERC-regulated cost 
of transporting gas from Henry Hub to California as the relevant input fuel price for natural gas-
fired facilities. 
  Similar problems arise with respect to cost-based dispatch electricity markets.  The 
regulator cannot simply accept without review a supplier’s claimed input costs.  Instead, the 
regulator must establish an administrative procedure for determining the input costs that are 
consistent with prudent purchasing behavior.  These prudently incurred input costs should then 
be used to set each supplier’s variable cost for the cost-based electricity spot market.  This 
requirement for the regulator to set standards for prudently incurred input costs requires the 
regulator to monitor the performance of input fuel markets and other input markets in order to 
make a determination of whether the input costs that a supplier claims are in fact appropriate to 
include in its regulated costs.  
Another approach builds on the mechanism recommended by the FERC staff for the 
western US electricity market.  The regulator would construct indices of input fuel prices based 
on forward contracts and spot purchases that it was able to verify were reflective of actual 
competitive conditions in these markets.  These indices would then be used to set the variable 
costs of each generation unit that subsequently entered the cost-based dispatch process.  There 
are a number of ways to structure the administrative process for validating a supplier’s claimed 
variable costs.  The major point that I would like to emphasize is that such a process is an 
essential feature of a cost-based electricity market. 
  This discussion underscores the major lesson from Section 2, that regulatory mechanisms 
and market mechanisms both have their strengths and weaknesses. Cost-based electricity markets 
have the increased regulatory burden associated with setting a standard for prudently incurred 
input costs for each generation unit.  To set these regulated costs of production, the regulator 
must also engage in more extensive data collection and analysis of market performance for input 
fuel and other inputs to the electricity production process.  Bid-based dispatch markets have the 
problems with system-wide and local market power discussed above. Although cost-based 
dispatch and pricing also has the long-term efficiency costs discussed in Section 3.2, given the 
enormous expense of setting up a bid-based spot market, the enormous potential downside of  
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such a market in terms of system-wide and local market power, and the relatively small potential 
gain from a bid-based dispatch and pricing in an ESI without active demand-side participation in 
the wholesale market, a superior strategy for LACs is cost-based dispatch and pricing for the 
foreseeable future. The potential benefits of bid-based dispatch and pricing and the huge 
uncertainty associated with these benefits in an ESI with a less-than-ideal transmission network 
and nascent regulatory framework makes cost-based dispatch even more attractive in spite of the 
regulatory challenges associated with determining each unit’s cost of production. 
 
4.5.  Regulating Default Retail Rates 
 
Determining the wholesale power cost component of the regulated retail electricity price is a 
challenging task even for developed countries.  The regulator must effectively run an energy 
trading firm to compute the best possible estimate of the least cost combinations of long-term 
contracts, medium-term contracts, spot purchases and other hedging instrument purchases.   
Because all transactions but spot purchases are made through bilateral negotiations, it is difficult 
for the regulator to know which transaction prices are legitimate and which are not.  For 
example, if the buyer and seller of electricity have some sort of financial relationship, the buyer 
may be willing to buy at an inflated price if these prices can be passed on to final consumers. 
  Consequently, the challenge for the regulator is how to set up a mechanism that yields the 
most useful information about the opportunity cost of power delivered on a given date and at a 
given location that can used to set the default rate for an electricity retailer.  This mechanism 
must guard against affiliate-dealing to raise the prices that consumers must pay.  Kolstad and 
Wolak (2003) present an example of this sort of problem in the California market with respect to 
NOx permit prices.  As discussed earlier, suppliers with units located in and outside of 
SCAQMD, the geographic area covered by the emissions permit market, were willing to pay 
inflated prices for these permits because the permits enhanced the ability of firms to raise 
wholesale electricity prices.   Kolstad and Wolak (2003) suggest a mechanism that can be used to 
limit the ability of suppliers to use NOx permits to raise electricity prices.  They argue that rather 
than allow suppliers to engage in bilateral NOx permit trades at any mutually agreed upon time, 
SCAQMD should run periodic anonymous auctions in which suppliers bid for the right to buy or 
sell these permits.  A single market-clearing price would then be set for all of the permits sold.   
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This price is more difficult to move because it is the result of the intersection of the aggregate 
demand bid curve for these permits with the aggregate supply curve.  
  This solution could be used by an LAC regulator to set the wholesale energy price 
implicit in the default retail price.  The regulator would define standardized forward contract 
products for specific locations and durations and then require retailers to use the anonymous 
auction market operated by the regulator to purchase the forward energy requirements (as 
determined by the regulator) necessary to meet its default provider obligation.  In a steady state, 
this process would produce a portfolio of forward prices for delivery at a given location and date 
in the future.   The prices for, say, May 2005 delivery implicit in contracts starting in each month 
of 2004 could be used to determine the wholesale price component of the default provider’s 
retail rate. For example, one scheme could use a pre-specified weighted average of the May 2005 
forward prices that result from these auctions as the wholesale cost component implicit in all 
regulated retail sales for May 2005. 
  This would accomplish two goals for the LAC regulator.  First, it would limit the ability 
of retailers to self-deal with their generation affiliates.  Second, it would allow the regulator to 
avoid the extremely difficult task of setting the level of the wholesale price component of the 
default provider retail price.  Variations on this theme could also be implemented, but the basic 
idea is to replace negotiated bilateral purchases with periodic formal forward markets for 
electricity as a mechanism for retailers to purchase the forward market obligations necessary to 
meet their default provider obligations. 
  Another mechanism that has been suggested to solve this problem is to establish a 
government-owned single buyer of wholesale electricity that subsequently sells this wholesale 
energy to electricity retailers. Although at first glance this solution seems to have much to 
recommend it, because it pits a single state-owned buyer against many sellers, this approach is 
nothing more than replacing one state-owned monopolist with another state-owned monopolist.  
The option of the former state-owned monopoly electricity supply company to purchase all its 
energy from electricity producers as a single buyer existed under the former vertically integrated 
monopoly regime.  The state-owned monopolist could have held periodic negotiations with 
suppliers to purchase its electricity needs for a certain number of years into the future, as a single 
buyer would do.  However, the former state-owned electricity supplier found it optimal to instead  
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construct and operate power plants.  Consequently, the single buyer alternative can be thought of 
as implementing a solution that was available in the former monopoly regime, but not found to 
be optimal.   For this reason, a single buyer solution is likely to yield market outcomes that are 
more harmful to electricity consumers than the former vertically integrated monopoly regime. 
It is important to stress that the single buyer model has limited incentives to minimize 
wholesale energy procurement costs for the same reason that the former state-owned ESI had 
limited incentives to minimize the cost of supplying wholesale electricity.  Both of these entities 
are state-owned, so we do not expect either to have strong incentives to minimize wholesale 
energy costs.  Moreover, building on the discussion in Section 2, having a large number of 
buyers of wholesale electricity, each competing to supply final consumers with electricity, 
should lead to lower wholesale prices than a state-owned single buyer.  Rewarding the load-
serving entities that procure wholesale power at least cost with the most retail load, provides very 
strong incentives for least-cost procurement of wholesale power.  In contrast, the single buyer 
does not lose any customers if it does not obtain the lowest possible price for wholesale 
electricity, because it is the monopoly buyer of wholesale power.  Moreover, it is also very likely 
that the state-owned single buyer will pursue other goals besides least-cost procurement of 
wholesale electricity because of the political pressures its management faces as a result of this 
entity’s government ownership.   
Consequently, despite apparent attractiveness, by applying the logic presented in Section 
2, the single buyer model is seen to be an available option not chosen by the former vertically 
integrated monopoly regime.  In this regard, it is important to emphasize another major lesson 
from Section 2: unless the new market design changes the incentives faced by market 
participants, their behavior will not change and market outcomes will not change.  In the present 
case, the single buyer still faces limited incentives to make the incurred cost of purchasing 
wholesale power equal the minimum cost of procuring wholesale power for many of the same 
reasons that the vertically integrated state-owned monopolist had limited incentives to make the 





                                                
4.6.  Capacity Adequacy in Rapidly Growing ESIs 
 
A major concern in LACs is whether there will be sufficient new generation capacity built in a 
timely manner to meet the rapidly growing demand for electricity in these countries.  Capacity 
payments have been proposed to encourage the necessary new investment.  Although I have no 
quarrel with the argument that paying suppliers a $/MW payment per day or per month for 
installed generation capacity provides incentives for the construction of new generation capacity, 
the more important question is whether these capacity payment schemes are the least-cost way to 
ensure future capacity adequacy.  The following logic demonstrates there are substantially lower- 
cost ways to achieve capacity adequacy. 
  The first shortcoming of capacity payment mechanisms is that it is unclear what product 
is actually being purchased.  The analogy to a capacity payment in other industries would be 
monthly payments to factories or merchants for simply being in existence.  It is hard to find other 
market environments where this kind of payment is made.  Instead, the supplier is only paid for 
the products it sells, not merely for being in existence.  Although a number of advocates of 
capacity payments attempt to call them capacity markets, this is really a misnomer.  As all 
Eastern United States ISOs with capacity payment schemes have discovered, it is virtually 
impossible to operate a market for installed capacity.  The marginal cost of supplying additional 
capacity is zero if there is adequate capacity in the control area and effectively infinite (in the 
short-run) if there is insufficient capacity.  Moreover, because the demand for capacity is 
perfectly inelastic—load-serving entities are typically required to buy some multiple of their 
peak demand in installed capacity—this can present severe market power problems.
4  
Specifically, if a supplier knows that its generation capacity is needed to meet the aggregate 
installed capacity demand (it is pivotal), this supplier can set the price of installed capacity at 
whatever level it would like.  For this reason, all of the capacity “markets” in the eastern US 
have price caps or maximum payments load-serving entities must make if they do not satisfy 
their installed capacity requirements.   Because what are often called capacity markets are in 
reality capacity payment schemes, this raises the important problem of how to set the appropriate 
level for the capacity payment.  The regulator is virtually certain to get this $/MW per month 
 
4 The PJM and ISO-New England ISOs have had substantial market power problems in their capacity “markets.”    
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payment wrong, in the sense of providing incentives for too much or too little generation 
capacity. 
  To understand the problems associated with setting the level of the capacity payment it is 
helpful to delve deeper into the rationale for capacity payments.  Unloaded generation capacity is 
needed in real-time to meet unexpected surges in demand and to ramp up quickly if a power 
plant is forced out or a transmission line is unexpectedly out.  Consequently, in order to meet a 
peak demand of 10,000 MW with some pre-specified level of reliability, more than 10,000 MW 
of generation capacity is needed.  There is a more efficient way to pay for the necessary 
operating reserve capacity than paying all generators a fixed $/MW per month.  All wholesale 
electricity markets in the US operate ancillary services markets to procure this standby 
generation capacity.  Suppliers bid their willingness to supply energy and ancillary services and 
the market operator determines the market-clearing price for each of these services, along with 
the price of energy.  Consequently, a supplier that is providing standby capacity is paid a $/MW 
charge for each hour it holds 1 MW of unloaded capacity providing operating reserve.  The 
ancillary services market only pays those generators providing standby capacity for the service 
they provide.  Units in the control area not providing energy or standby capacity service during 
an hour do not receive ancillary services payments. 
  This ancillary services market mechanism directs capacity payments to those units that 
provide real-time reserve capacity.  These tend to be the high-cost, fast-start units.  Although 
these units only recover their variable costs or slightly more by providing energy, they are able to 
obtain full cost recovery over the year because they provide standby capacity for virtually all of 
the remaining hours of the year when they do not operate.  Low variable cost units, which tend to 
run the majority of hours, can obtain full cost recovery from selling energy because their variable 
cost is below the market price the vast majority of hours of the year.  There is no need to pay 
these units a capacity payment to keep them in the market.  Consequently, there is no need to 
make capacity payments in a market that pays for all of the real-time operating reserve that the 
system operator uses. 
  A final problem with capacity payments is that they do not, in general, provide an 
incentive for units to be available when the system operator needs them.  In other words, 
capacity payments do very little to eliminate the incentive that suppliers have to withhold  
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capacity from the spot market.  As discussed in Wolak (2003b), the cause of the California 
electricity crisis was not insufficient generation capacity relative to the level of demand, but 
insufficient incentives for suppliers to make all of the capacity they owned available to the spot 
market.  Therefore, the problem of capacity adequacy should be reformulated as ensuring that 
load-serving entities have purchased sufficient quantities of energy in the forward market to 
ensure enough energy is made available to the short-term market for the operators to be able to 
reliability operate the system in real-time.  For example, suppose a load-serving entity buys 95 
percent of its expected demand for the coming year in the forward market.  For the sellers of 
these forward commitments to be confident they can supply the required MWh, more generation 
capacity must exist than the maximum hourly demand in the contract, because of the generation 
and transmission availability uncertainties described above.   
Rather than thinking about the capacity adequacy in terms of having sufficient generation 
capacity constructed inside the control area of the ISO, the question should be recast as that of 
insuring energy adequacy.  Specifically, do all of the load-serving entities have sufficient 
quantities of forward energy commitments of a long enough duration into the future to be 
confident they can meet their future energy needs with these contracts and spot market 
purchases?  Therefore, load-serving entities should not be concerned with the question of the 
existence of sufficient generation capacity constructed in the ISO’s control area to meet future 
demand.  Instead, they should focus on the question of purchasing enough energy far enough in 
advance of delivery to be able to meet their real-time load obligations with a desired level of 
reliability, and leave the decision of how much capacity to build to achieve this level of 
reliability to the sellers of these forward contracts. If the sellers believe additional generation 
capacity is needed to meet the forward energy obligations they have sold, they have a strong 
incentive to construct these facilities or bear the large financial risk of being short relative to 
their forward energy obligations in the short-term energy markets. 
  This discussion of capacity markets can be summarized as follows.  Having adequate 
capacity to meet demand does not guarantee that this demand will ultimately be served.  Having 
purchased sufficient energy in the forward market far enough in advance of delivery guarantees 
the load-serving entity is hedged against spot price risk.  Consequently, the major challenge 
associated with capacity adequacy is providing load-serving entities with strong incentives to  
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accurately forecast their future energy needs and buy them far enough in advance real-time 
delivery so that suppliers can construct the necessary generation facilities to meet these future 
energy obligations.  Finally, as noted above, capacity payments do little to solve this future 
energy adequacy problem. 
 
4.7.  Government versus Private Participation in the ESI 
 
Section 2 compared the incentives for firm operation provided by government versus private 
ownership.  I now use that analysis to provide recommendations for what portions of the ESI in 
an LAC should be privately owned and which can remain in government hands initially and even 
indefinitely.  For this discussion it is useful to divide the electricity supply industry into four 
segments: (1) generation, (2) transmission, (3) distribution and (4) retailing. 
  Because the technology of producing transmission services for a given geographic area 
dramatically favors supply by a single firm, the price generators and retailers pay for accessing 
the transmission network must be set by an administrative process, whether or not the network is 
government-owned or privately owned.  In addition, the transmission network access charge 
usually makes up between 10 percent and 15 percent of the retail price of electricity.  The largest 
cost associated with providing transmission services after the network has been built is for 
maintaining the network.  These last two points argue in favor of the view that cost differences 
due to productive inefficiency differences caused by government versus private ownership will 
not be a very large fraction of the retail price of electricity. 
  There are also potential benefits, particularly in developing countries, associated with 
keeping the transmission network in government hands.  Obtaining rights-of-way and 
environmental approval for transmission expansion may be less costly if the government rather 
than a private investor owns the transmission network.   Consequently, even though the incurred 
cost of operating the network may be greater for a government-owned firm (because of the 
associated productive inefficiencies resulting from government ownership), this may be offset by 
the lower transaction costs associated with expanding the transmission network.  This logic 
suggests that keeping the transmission network in government hands would not be harmful to the 
formation of a competitive market and may even result in lower delivered prices to consumers.  
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  The argument for government versus private-ownership of the distribution network is 
similar, but slightly stronger in favor of private ownership.  The cost of the distribution network 
is a larger fraction of the price of electricity than is transmission.  This means that increased 
inefficiencies due to government ownership could mean higher prices under government versus 
private ownership.  The siting advantage for government ownership is also less relevant for 
distribution because there is rarely an alternative path for the distribution wire to a customer’s 
house, but there are often many possible routes for bulk transmission lines.  Also, if consumers 
want electricity they must be willing to tolerate the construction of a local distribution network.   
  Particularly, for the case of LACs, where the percentage of the population with access to 
electricity is significantly less than 100 percent, privately-owned profit-maximizing firms should 
have a stronger incentive to expand their distribution networks to serve these areas than 
government-owned firms.  Consequently, assuming a properly designed mechanism for setting 
the regulated price for accessing the local distribution network, private ownership should be 
favored.   
  The case for privately owned retailers is very strong.  In many developing countries the 
government-owned company often finds it impossible to get a substantial fraction of their 
customers to pay for electricity.  Moreover, the company often finds it difficult to disconnect 
customers that do not pay because they are politically powerful.   Turning ownership over to 
private investors provides much stronger incentives for retailers to get consumers to pay their 
bills.  Any money the retailer does not collect from consumers must come out of the pockets of 
the firm’s owners.  In contrast, government-owned firms can fund this shortfall from tax 
revenue.  Private ownership also makes it easier for the retailer to disconnect from the network 
customers who do not pay their bills.  For all of these reasons, retailers should be privately 
owned as soon as possible. 
  In most LACs, a large fraction of the generation capacity is initially owned by the 
government.  Clearly, reducing the government’s ownership share will give private investors 
greater confidence in their ability to invest in new capacity and earn sufficient revenues from 
electricity sales to earn a reasonable return on the investment, because they know that more 
generation capacity is owned by entities that face the same budget constraints as they do.  They 
are likely to be less fearful that their investments might be expropriated by a future government  
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that releases water from its hydroelectric facilities too quickly in order to reduce wholesale 
electricity prices for political reasons. 
   On the other hand, private ownership puts generation capacity in the hands of entities 
with strong incentives to use it to raise wholesale electricity prices.  However, so long as system 
dispatch and pricing are based on regulated costs, this risk should be less of a cause for concern. 
  A strong point against immediate plant divestiture to private owners is that the capacity 
may be sold at a discount because the buyers are not confident that the government will support 
the new competitive wholesale market.  By keeping the capacity in government hands and 
operating under the new regime for a couple of years, investors should gain greater confidence in 
the government’s support of the new wholesale market regime.  The conclusion for the 
generation sector is private ownership as rapidly possible, consistent with obtaining a reasonable 
price for the government’s generation assets. 
  There is an additional argument in favor of private ownership in both electricity 
production and retailing.  This has to do with the liquidation of insolvent firms.  One source of 
potential benefits from a market mechanism is the fact that inefficient suppliers are forced to exit 
the industry.  One measure of the success of a re-structuring process is the extent to which 
inefficient suppliers exit and efficient suppliers grow. In a market with privately-owned 
companies, this process is relatively straightforward as long as the country has well-defined 
bankruptcy laws that are enforced.  If a firm reaches the point where it is unable to pay its 
creditors, they can demand that the company liquidate its assets.  Usually, companies in poor 
financial condition forecast this endpoint and attempt to exit the industry in a manner that 
maximizes the value of the firm’s assets.  Government-owned firms complicate this process 
because governments are extremely reluctant to allow the companies they own to exit.  This 
means that very poorly run government-owned companies can remain in business for an almost 
indefinite period of time without earning sufficient revenues to cover their costs.  This can 
induce severe distortions in the allocation of production across firms in the industry.  A very 
inefficient government-owned firm can continue to serve a large fraction of demand, much to the 
detriment of more efficient suppliers.  This logic provides another rationale for ending 
government participation in these sectors of the industry as soon as it is feasible.  It also  
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underscores the necessity of shoring up a country’s bankruptcy laws before going forward with 
the re-structuring process. 
 
5.  Lessons for Market Design from Specific LACs 
 
This section discusses the market design challenges specific to each of the five LACs that I 
visited.  Some of these challenges were discussed in general terms in the previous section, 
whereas others are unique to the country under consideration.  The primary goal of this section is 
to point out how the market designer must adapt the ESI restructuring process to the initial 
conditions in the industry each country.  The quantity and mix of generation capacity, the level 
and annual pattern of demand, the legal framework governing the industry and geographic 




Brazil is the prototypical example of the gambling with the weather problem discussed in the 
Section 3.  Hydroelectric facilities produce the vast majority of electricity.  The cost-of-deficit 
parameter used in the cost-based stochastic dynamic programming dispatch model is extremely 
low relative to international standards, and the recommendations given in Section 3 apply 
directly to Brazil.  The cost-of-deficit parameter should be increased to levels that reflect the 
social cost of deficits and retail rates should be adjusted on a seasonal basis to reflect current 
conditions in the wholesale market.  Retail prices that reflect current water availability in the 
retail price will ensure that periods of shortage do not occur. 
  Another significant source of inefficiencies in the current Brazilian market design is the 
Energy Reallocation Mechanism (MRE).  This mechanism pays hydroelectric suppliers 
according to the share of assured energy certificates (CEAs) they own rather than according to 
their actual hourly output.  CEAs are awarded to each hydroelectric facility in Brazil according 
to a somewhat arbitrary administrative process.  Each hour the total quantity of hydroelectric 
energy produced in Brazil is measured, and this production is allocated to each hydroelectric 
supplier according to the share of the total system-wide CEAs allocated to this generation unit, 
regardless of how much energy the unit supplies during the hour.  In contrast, fossil fuel units are 
paid the hourly spot price based on their actual production.    
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The MRE distorts plant investment decisions across fuel types and locations in the 
transmission network.  A new hydroelectric entrant earns revenues based on the number of CEAs 
it obtains from the administrative process for constructing the unit, not based on the actual hourly 
output of the unit. Consequently, one can easily imagine a circumstance where the hydroelectric 
unit that provides the greatest benefits to system reliability is not built because the administrative 
process for construction awards a larger quantity of CEAs to a unit at a different location in the 
transmission network.  The MRE also induces a bias against the construction of fossil fuel 
facilities, because they must factor in the risk of not being dispatched into their revenue risk 
calculation, whereas hydroelectric facilities are guaranteed their share of the system-wide output 
of hydroelectric facilities whether or not they produce any electricity during the hour. 
  The MRE hinders the development of liquid forward market for electricity because it 
significantly reduces the incentives for hydroelectric suppliers to be active participants in this 
market, as they already have a relatively certain revenue steam for their facilities.  Because the 
MRE pays hydroelectric generators whether their unit operates or not, this significantly dulls the 
incentives for owners to maintain their units in top working order.  A major benefit of the spot 
market default payment mechanism in all other electricity markets is that it pays suppliers the 
highest prices during the hours in which their units are most needed to maintain system 
reliability.  Consequently, unit owners have a strong incentive to maintain their units in top 
working order in case an hour or series of hours arises when the units will receive a particularly 
high price for supplying electricity. 
  The MRE should be phased out as soon as possible.  The longer it is allowed to remain in 
force, the greater will be the amount of new capacity built at the wrong location in the 
transmission network and using the wrong input fuel.  The most straightforward way to 
accomplish this is by a multi-year scheme that reduces the amount of MRE-based payments each 
year.  For example, during the first year, 90 percent of the revenues could come from the MRE 
and the remaining 10 percent from spot market production and sales.  Over time the MRE share 
would fall and the spot market portion rise, until at the end of a pre-specified time period the 
MRE share would equal zero.  Similar mechanisms are used to phase out vesting contracts 




  Brazil has also had substantial difficulties establishing a credible regulatory mechanism.  
The rationing period in 2001 severely undermined the public’s and government’s confidence in 
the regulatory body, ANEEL.  This is particularly unfortunate for Brazil, where the major load 
centers are located far from the new sources of hydroelectric power.  Expansion of the 
transmission network is therefore essential to meeting Brazil’s demand growth with new 
hydroelectric capacity.  A strong regulator is needed to oversee this transmission expansion 
process.  Also, and as quickly as possible, Brazil needs to develop the necessary regulatory 
expertise and credibility to determine the magnitude and location of transmission upgrades. It is 
very unlikely that the necessary new transmission capacity will be built without the promise of a 
regulated rate of return on the investment, so the regulator must also devise a mechanism for 
sharing the burden of paying for these transmission investments among market participants; 
managing these processes would strain the regulatory process even in most developed countries.  
Therefore, Brazil appears to be an ideal candidate for the independent international committee of 
experts described in the previous section.  Such a committee could provide much need expertise 
and credibility to the regulatory process. 
  Finally, Brazil is currently considering a single-buyer model for wholesale electricity 
procurement.  For the reasons listed in the previous section, this is a step backwards to the 
former state-owned, vertically integrated monopoly regime rather than a step forward to the 




Chile has the most mature electricity market in Latin America.  It has been in operation for 
almost twenty years, and there are four separate networks in Chile.  The Central Interconnected 
System (SIC) is by far the largest.  It serves 90 percent of the population and more than 40 
percent of the land area.  The majority of the generation capacity in the SIC is hydroelectric.  The 
Great North Interconnected System (SING) serves primarily mining consumers and is almost 
entirely thermal.  The other two grids represent only a small portion of the installed capacity in 
Chile. 
The designers of the Chilean market recognized the importance of developing an active 
forward market for energy.   Since the initial ESI reforms, the SIC has operated a cost-of-service  
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spot market using a series of stochastic dynamic programming models to determine the 
opportunity cost of water from the variable cost of fossil fuel units and a cost-of-deficit 
parameter.  The model has led to a substantial amount of new generation capacity constructed in 
both the SIC and SING.  Most of this capacity uses natural gas and coal.  The availability of 
natural gas from Argentina has allowed the construction of a number of combined-cycle gas 
turbine facilities.  Viewed from the perspective of ensuring capacity adequacy, the Chilean 
market has been successful. However, for many of the same reasons as Brazil, it has had 
problems ensuring energy adequacy in the short run in response to low hydro conditions. 
During the period 1998-1999, Chile had an energy shortage because of a sustained period 
of low water availability coupled with a retail price system that does not reflect current 
conditions in the wholesale market in retail electricity rates.  Fischer and Galetovic (2001) also 
attribute these electricity shortages to a regulatory mechanism that failed to act quickly and 
aggressively enough to prevent the shortage period from occurring.  While the severity and 
duration of these shortages may have been enhanced by the shortcomings of the regulatory 
governance mechanism, the cause of the shortage appears to be the gambling with the weather 
problem described in Section 4.1. The cost-of-deficit parameter in the stochastic dynamic 
programming models used to dispatch hydroelectric capacity is far below the highest willingness 
to pay for electricity of all consumers in Chile.  In fact, it is of the same $/MWh order of 
magnitude as value that exists in Brazil at the present time. 
The water level in the Laja reservoir, the largest reservoir in Chile, determines the 
opportunity cost of water.  When full, this reservoir holds enough water to generate about one-
quarter of Chile’s annual consumption of electricity.  The stochastic dynamic program used to 
set the opportunity cost of water trades off the benefit of using water today against the cost of 
using water in the future and therefore having to operate thermal capacity or ration energy.  As 
discussed in Section 4.1, a low cost-of-deficit parameter tells the stochastic dynamic program 
that water shortages are not too costly, and as consequence, water will be used more intensively 
than it should to safeguard against shortage periods.  Spot wholesale electricity prices are also 
lower than they should be, which encourages over-consumption of electricity and increases the 
likelihood of shortage periods.  
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As discussed in Section 4.1, during most years the gambling with the weather strategy 
will be successful because sufficient water is available to meet the system’s energy needs.   
However, during low water conditions, the hydro system can reach a point-of-no-return from a 
shortage period.  By this I mean that at the water levels in the reservoirs at that time, even if the 
thermal plants are operated as much as they are physically able, there will be an annual energy 
shortfall.  As discussed in Section 4, during these circumstances, retail prices must be raised to 
cause demand to ration the available supply.  Although this eventuality cannot be avoided with 
certainty by raising the cost-of-deficit parameter, it can be reduced to an extremely small 
probability by a sufficiently high cost-of-deficit parameter.  This higher cost-of-deficit parameter 
will cause fossil fuel plants to be operated more frequently in order to use the available water 
more conservatively.  The higher this cost-of-deficit parameter is set the lower will be the 
probability of a period when retail prices must be increased to reduce demand to the level of the 
available supply. 
The geography of Chile increases the share transmission network costs in the delivered 
price of electricity relative other countries in Latin America and around the world.  The country 
is extremely long and thin, so that transmission losses can be very large for demand located far 
from the generation centers. One component of the revenue stream to the transmission owner is 
associated with the fact that the marginal cost of withdrawals in a generation-rich area are lower 
than the marginal cost of withdrawals in a generation-deficient area.  However, these payments 
are not in general sufficient to compensate the transmission owner for all of its costs.  This has 
led the regulator to implement a toll component that every generation unit owner must pay to the 
transmission owner.  This is a fixed charge based on a number of administrative procedures.  
Specifically, the regulator determines the “Area of Influence” of a generator, which is the 
minimum combination of lines, substations and other transmission network installations that 
allow each generator to connect to the reference node of the electricity network.  Each generator 
is then assessed a transmission charge in proportion to their “Area of Influence.”   There is an 
additional toll component to account for energy produced by the generator that is carried further 
than the generator’s area of influence. 
These two procedures for assessing transmission tolls are viewed by many generation 
unit owners as arbitrary.  These concerns seem valid because it is difficult to see how these cost-  
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allocation procedures can be rationalized based on economic cost causation principles.  Because 
all generation units are connected to the same transmission network, and because the laws of 
physics rather than economic contract paths determine energy flows in the network, it is 
extremely difficult to allocate all transmission network costs on the basis of cost-causation 
principles.  In particular, all electricity produced by all units in the SIC is not delivered to the 
reference node for the electricity system.   
Any mechanism to pay for transmission network should allocate all costs that are caused 
by the actions taken by specific market participants to the market participant that cause them.  
However, the remaining costs that cannot be causally allocated should be clearly identified and 
those should be recovered from market participants in a manner that induces the least costly 
distortions in generation unit operating decisions and new plant location decisions.  Cost-
allocation schemes based on observable characteristics on market participants, such as where 
they are located in the transmission network, can cause market participants to take actions to 
reduce the costs that are allocated to them.  These actions may also degrade system’s reliability 
or increase wholesale energy prices.  To avoid these problems, all of the ISOs in the United 
States recover the non-causal portion of costs of the transmission network from a per MWh 
charge on all withdrawals of energy from the transmission network. 
Currently the SIC and SING are not interconnected, in spite of the fact that prices in 
SING are extremely low because of a large amount of generation capacity in the northern part of 
Chile. A transmission cost allocation scheme, which makes a clearer distinction between causal 
costs that can be attributed to specific market participants and common costs that must be 
recovered from all market participants, may make it easier to construct an interconnection 
between these two systems. This would provide substantial reliability benefits for the hydro-
dominated SIC and access for the SING to the SIC’s substantial hydroelectric resources. 
Chile also provides a concrete example of a major conclusion from Section 2 concerning 
the importance of accounting for the individual rationality constraint in the market design 
process.  Chile has implemented what in theory appears to be an extremely high-powered 
incentive regulation scheme for its distribution utilities.  The electricity law in Chile requires the 
regulator to construct an “efficient distribution company” from which to derive the rates that will 
apply to all companies of that type, where the type of company is measured by the density of  
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customers served in the service territory.  In theory, this scheme should provide very strong 
incentives for companies to reduce their production costs, because their regulated price does not 
depend on their own actions.  However, as Alejandro Jadresic (the Minister of Energy from 
1994-1998) notes, the threat of judicial review forces the regulator to look at actual company 
performance.  Dyck and DiTella (2002) analyze the performance of this regulatory mechanism 
and reproduce the following quote from Jadresic, “When building the model, you end up always 
looking at what happens in actual companies.  The cost studies are subject to the challenge of 
verifiability in court; the model company could be regarded as a pure ungrounded imaginary 
construction.” 
Dyck and Di Tella (2002) provide convincing empirical evidence that companies also 
recognize this fact and appear to alter their balance sheet costs in preparation for a coming 
regulatory review. Although Dyck and Di Tella find significant cost reductions among 
distribution companies over the course of each price cap period, they find a U-shaped pattern to 
these cost reductions.  Trends in cost reductions are reversed every four years, apparently in 
response to the regulatory reviews that set a new price cap, which also occur every four years.  
Consistent with the predictions implied by the individually rationality constraint on distribution 
company behavior and the fact that distribution companies recognize the regulator must account 
for their current financial position or risk judicial review, the cost reductions achieved during the 
initial years of the price cap regime slow down and reverse as the time of a new review 
approaches.   
Dyck and DiTella’s results should not be taken as an argument for the inferiority of price 
cap regulation versus other forms of regulation. Instead, it should be seen only as an argument in 
favor of the position that designing a regulation process that achieves productive efficiency is 
impossible, and that individual rationality implies that firms will maximize their objective 
function subject to the constraints on their behavior implied by the regulatory process. 
5.3. Colombia 
Columbia is one of the few LACs that uses a bid-based spot market.  Surprisingly this did not 
prevent shortage periods due to lack of water availability from occurring in Colombia.  This 
provides empirical evidence that a bid-based market will not prevent apparent shortage periods 
from occurring. Colombia faces the same problem other hydro-based system in Latin America  
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face, the inability to reflect current conditions in the wholesale market in the retail rates that 
consumers pay.   This means that apparent shortage periods will occur when the annual demand 
at the prevailing retail price exceeds the amount of available water assuming that the available 
fossil fuel units are operated as intensively as possible. 
  There is an additional reason for Colombia to adopt a cost-based dispatch market rather 
than a bid-based one.  The transmission network is subject to frequent de-ratings, and many of 
the hydroelectric facilities are located far from the load centers. This means that opportunities for 
suppliers to exercise local market power because of transmission line outages can be significant.  
For this reason, a cost-based dispatch, in spite of the problems mentioned in Section 4.4, seems 
to make better sense for Colombia. 
  Colombia has also had difficulty establishing a credible regulatory mechanism.  This has 
been exacerbated by the existence of a bid-based spot market that requires the regulator to 
determine when suppliers’ exercise of unilateral market power harms system reliability and 
market efficiency enough to justify regulatory intervention.  Formulating a regulatory 
mechanism to deal with this problem has been extremely challenging for developed countries 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom, so it not surprising that the Colombian 
regulator has found this difficult.  This fact is another argument against a bid-based spot market 
in Colombia.  If a cost-based spot market is adopted, I expect the regulatory challenges described 
in Section 4.4 to arise.  For these reasons, Colombia appears to be another ideal candidate for the 
independent advisory committee of experts to assist the regulator establishing the necessary 




Honduras is representative of the challenges faced by a number of small LACs.  It has a peak 
demand of approximately 800 MW and an installed capacity of slightly over 900 MW. Slightly 
less than half of the installed capacity is hydroelectric.   The remaining capacity uses fossil fuels, 
although Honduras has no significant domestic fossil fuel energy sources.  Electricity demand is 
expected to grow rapidly for the near future, primarily because a significant fraction of the 
population does not currently have access to electricity.  
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  Restructuring in a country as small as Honduras is complicated by the fact that the 
minimum efficient scale of a new combined cycle natural gas facility is a substantial fraction of 
the peak demand in the country.  For this reason, anything but a cost-based spot market is out of 
question for Honduras. It should concentrate on developing an active forward market where 
privately-owned companies can sell the necessary forward energy commitments necessary to 
build the new capacity needed to meet the country’s growing demand.  Because Honduras has no 
significant domestic fossil fuel supplies, there are clear benefits to encouraging diversity in the 
input fossil fuels that its plants can burn. 
  The potential benefits from expanded transmission interconnections with other Central 
American countries are substantial.  This should be a top priority for the restructuring process in 
Central America.  With expanded interconnections, Central American countries can increase the 
capacity utilization rates on base load fossil-fuel facilities and share plentiful water conditions or 
more efficiently manage low water conditions throughout the region.  Central American 
countries could also maintain the same level of domestic grid reliability with less capacity in the 
control area, because capacity outside the region could be relied upon to provide operating 
reserves. 
  Increased regional coordination among the country-level regulators in Central American 
countries would increase the likelihood that these interconnections would be built. The 
independent committee of experts approach once again appears to be a viable solution to this 
problem.  Establishing such a committee for the entire Central American region would spread the 
cost over a number of countries and foster information-sharing across the various countries.  One 





Mexico has the potential to realize substantial benefits from ESI restructuring. It has abundant 
fossil fuel energy sources, particularly oil and natural gas, and average retail electricity prices 
seem high relative to international standards given this relatively abundant natural resource base.  
Mexico continues to experience rapid demand growth fueled by a robust national economy and 
expanding industrial sector.  A major concern of the Mexican government is the ability of the  
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state-owned monopoly to construct the necessary generation capacity to meet this demand 
growth.  Unfortunately, in spite of the clear need for ESI restructuring and the large potential 
benefits to the citizens of Mexico, the necessary capacity expansion is unlikely to occur in the 
near future. 
  In this regard, Mexico is a prime example of the necessity of accounting for initial 
conditions in the country and industry in formulating a restructuring strategy.  The Mexican 
constitution explicitly prohibits any entity but the government from providing electricity for 
public service.  Unless this provision is amended the options available to Mexico for 
restructuring its industry are extremely limited. 
  However, there has been one benefit to this legal barrier to industry restructuring.  The 
energy regulatory commission in Mexico (CRE) has been studying this issue for the past two 
years.  In the process, it has interacted extensively with international experts and gained 
considerable expertise in electricity market design, which should enhance its credibility in the 
event that ESI restructuring eventually takes place. 
 
6.  Suggested Standard Market Design For LACs 
 
This section builds on the analysis of the previous sections to outline the general features of a 
standard market design for LACs.   I also note how this standard design can be modified as more 
of the necessary conditions for a competitive wholesale market are realized in each country. 
  The first step in any market design process is to establish an independent regulator or 
regulatory body.  The US model of a regulatory body appointed by the executive branch of the 
government subject to the approval of the legislative branch is preferable.  Decisions should be 
made based on a legal record prepared by the parties involved, managed by an administrative law 
judge and supported by a regulatory staff of economic, legal, and power systems engineering 
experts.  The staff of the regulatory body should be hired in anticipation of the duties they will 
perform, rather than in response to the demand for additional regulatory oversight.   
  As discussed is previous sections, the regulatory process must be forward looking, rather 
than backward looking.   Market design flaws and other regulatory problems must be identified 
and addressed as quickly as possible.   There should be a substantial training component at the  
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start of the market design process.  For example, visits by the regulatory commission staff to 
other functioning wholesale markets around the world would provide useful background.  Failure 
to learn from international experience can be extremely costly.  Many of the early market failures 
in the US could have been avoided had FERC taken more seriously the lessons from other 
markets around the world.   Specifically, these markets had substantial experience dealing with 
system-wide and local market power issues that FERC, for the most part, ignored until the 
aftermath of the California crisis. 
  Once the regulatory process is in place, the first task for this entity is to develop a 
forward market for electricity where private investors sell obligations to supply electricity that 
can be used to finance new generation capacity.   At least for the foreseeable future, establishing 
a formal bid-based spot market seems too costly in terms of potential consumer harm to justify.   
Problems with unilateral and local market power have proven extremely difficult for developed 
countries to solve, and many of them have a long history with regulation and competition policy 
that most LACs do not share  
 Because  all  suppliers  need to buy and sell deviations from their final day-ahead schedules 
or longer-term energy schedules, a real-time market is necessary.   This can be accomplished by 
the former vertically integrated monopolist operating a real-time imbalance market using cost-
based bids.  All suppliers must file their costs with the ISO and regulator, and after these costs 
are validated by the regulator they are made publicly available to all market participants.  The 
ISO then dispatches all units based on these costs, which also produces locational marginal 
prices (LMPs) at all nodes in the network.  It is not essential that suppliers be paid or pay their 
LMP for deviations from their final energy schedules.  Retailers and large consumers could also 
be charged prices aggregated over larger geographic areas.  However, LMPs are the best signals 
of the cost of withdrawing power at each node in the network, so the regulator should have a 
very good reason for not paying generation units according to these prices and charging load-
serving entities for their wholesale purchases at these prices. 
  Initially there is little need to divest capacity from the incumbent monopolist.  It is more 
important for the regulator to focus on obtaining credible start-up, no-load and variable cost 
figures for all units in the control area.  The dispatch process should also incorporate a more 
realistic cost of shortage parameter. The easiest way to set the cost-of-deficit parameter is to  
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simulate hydro conditions and fossil-fuel unit variable costs for a number of values of this 
parameter to determine the relationship between the probability of shortages and the value of the 
cost-of-deficit parameter.  The regulator should then set the initial value of this parameter to 
achieve the level and probability of shortage less than a value jointly agreed upon by all market 
participants. 
  The goal of cost-based dispatch for imbalances in real-time is to establish a transparent 
mechanism that all market participants can use to assess the costs and benefits of using this 
imbalance mechanism.  New entrants can factor these costs into their willingness to supply 
energy on long-term contracts at specific locations in the transmission network.  Cost-based 
dispatch also avoids most of the problems associated with a transmission network that cannot 
support a competitive wholesale spot market, an initial condition that exists in almost all LACs.  
Setting LMPs using cost-based bids will provide useful information to the ISO about the benefits 
of transmission upgrades in the network and important input into the long-term process of 
constructing an economically reliable transmission network. 
  A cost-based dispatch mechanism also allows the ISO to be a market participant.   
However, because the ISO must run a cost-based dispatch based on publicly available cost data, 
there is less concern with permitting the ISO to take a position in the real-time dispatch.  
  Once this dispatch process has been established, the process of opening the wholesale 
market to consumers can begin.  This should be demand driven.  By this I mean that to the extent 
that large consumers are willing to subject themselves to the hourly spot price as their default 
price, the wholesale market should grow. 
  This market structure implies two types of consumers.  The first are negawatt suppliers, 
who are the demand-side equivalent of privately owned generation owners.  They must purchase 
all of their demand at either the hourly spot price or at a forward contract price they have 
managed to negotiate with some electricity supplier.  The second are those who wish to remain 
with their monopoly retailer.  The monopoly retailer for their geographic area must manage the 
spot price risk associated with serving these captive customers.  The regulator should encourage 
the default suppliers to set retail prices that vary with system conditions for captive consumers. 
  The difference between the negawatt suppliers and captive customers is that the former 
group can shop around with any supplier for a better forward contract price for their electricity  
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needs but can never return to being a captive consumer.  Because the negawatt suppliers cannot 
return to their default provider, in exchange for the opportunity to pay a lower price, they now 
face the risk that there will not be enough new capacity to meet their demand.  This will give 
them incentives to enter into forward contracts that can be used to finance new investments. 
  In order to set the retail price the monopoly retailers must pay for wholesale electricity, 
the regulator will run periodic auctions for standardized contracts for electricity supply and 
retailers will be required to buy a pre-specified fraction of their load obligations each year in the 
future from these markets. 
  A final issue with this market design is how to handle the issue of system-wide shortages 
of water.  The only way to ultimately solve this problem is to raise the cost-of-deficit parameter 
to a high enough level to reflect the full economic and political costs of shortages.  Because of 
the potential for a substantial retail price increase if the cost-of-deficit parameter is increased, 
this parameter should be slowly increased over time.  At the same time, the transition should 
begin to expose all the regulated consumers to retail prices that vary with actual system 
conditions.  In this way, the theoretical ideal cost-of-deficit parameter can be set, and can 
consumers decide the retail price at which they are willing to curtail their demand.  This cost-of-
deficit parameter, combined with pricing to final consumers that reflect current conditions in the 
wholesale market, will completely eliminate the possibility of system-wide shortages. 
 
7.  Concluding Comments on Designing Competitive Wholesale Markets in 
LACs 
 
Wholesale markets in LACs should be designed for the initial conditions that exist in the ESI.  
The successful market designs in developed countries and LACs emphasize this very important 
lesson.  The California electricity crisis provides a graphic example of the economic harm that is 
possible when a restructuring process ignores the initial conditions in the market.  In California’s 
case, coupling a wholesale market where electricity generation unit owners and energy traders 
had enormous flexibility to take action to maximize their profits with a retail market that put 
substantial restrictions on the actions of the large retailers created a recipe for disaster.   
Combining this with a regulatory process poorly prepared to deal with the regulatory problems  
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that can arise in a wholesale market environment, allowed a flawed market design to turn into an 
economic disaster from which California is still attempting to recover.  
Consequently, the goal for ESI reform in LACs is gradual progress to the ultimate goal of 
a competitive market that benefits consumers with the appropriate safeguards in place at the start 
of the market to protect them from significant financial harm.  Another important reason for this 
continuous improvement strategy is that it allows a nascent regulatory process to gain expertise 
and credibility.  With substantial safeguards in place at the start of market, the regulator’s job is 
much more straightforward.  However, as these safeguards are released, her job becomes far 
more challenging.   
Finally, even though a slow but steady strategy for ESI reform seems optimal for LACs, 
it is still important to make this process consistent with achieving the market designer’s long-
term goals of a competitive wholesale market that yields the maximum benefits possible to 
consumers.  Therefore, the market designer should avoid locking-in beneficial safeguards that 
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